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ABSTRACT 
Abstract 
Social protection has come to feature more and more prominently on international and national 
development agendas. This quest for social protection in developing countries raises an important question: 
how can social protection act and be supported as an instrument for redistribution of wealth at the national 
level? Assessing and enhancing the redistributive potential of social protection mechanisms requires a multi-
dimensional analysis and approach, encompassing political, technical, institutional and financial 
considerations. This study reports on a two-phased research combining conceptual work (Fonteneau & Van 
Ongevalle, 2015) with case studies in Senegal and Morocco in order to build and test a theoretical framework 
that can guide the assessment of the redistributive potential of social protection mechanisms in a developing 
context. The study offers in-depth insight into two ongoing social protection reforms: the adoption of Law 65.00 
in 2002 on Basic Medical Coverage which initiated the introduction of a mandatory health insurance (AMO) 
for the formal sector and the establishment of a medical assistance scheme for the economically destitute 
(RAMED) in Morocco; and the ‘Extension of the health coverage through mutual health organisations in the 
context of decentralisation’ (DECAM) in Senegal. Based on insights from these two case studies, the study 
calls for development actors to support a maximalist interpretation of redistributive social protection, to make 
sure their support to social protection reforms is politically-smart, and to promote a more inclusive and 
meaningful stakeholder participation in policy making processes. The study demonstrates the need for a multi-
dimensional analysis as well as the usefulness of the proposed theoretical framework to guide a 
comprehensive assessment of the redistributive potential of social protection mechanisms. 
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PREFACE 
Preface 
BeFinD is a consortium of four Belgian research centres at three different universities. It performs 
policy-oriented research related to the Financing for Development Agenda (2014-2017). The research 
is done on behalf of the Belgian Federal Public Service Foreign affairs, Foreign Trade and 
Development Cooperation, and hosted by the Flemish Inter-university Council (VLIR-UOS). The 
University of Namur (CRED), the University of Antwerp (IOB), and the University of Leuven 
(HIVA & GGS) are jointly coordinating research activities in 4 main areas: local resources for 
development, mobilising private resources for development, ODA and its relationship with other 
development-relevant funding flows, and global public goods. The research is oriented towards 
informing policies and practices of Belgian bilateral and multilateral development cooperation actors 
regarding the emerging landscape of development finance. HIVA-KU Leuven is contributing to the 
research activities on the redistributive potential of social protection, the role of the private sector in 
development, illegal financial flows, and global public goods. This report presents the results of our 
research on social protection. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Introduction 
Social protection has come to feature more and more prominently on international and national 
development agendas. Over the past decade different UN agencies and bilateral donors developed 
or updated their approach on social protection: a Social Protection Inter-Agency Cooperation Board 
jointly chaired by ILO and the World Bank was established in 2012, the World Bank and ILO jointly 
launched the universal social protection initiative in 2015 and social protection has been integrated 
in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The quest for social protection in developing 
countries opens an important debate on the role of domestic versus international resources in 
financing social protection (Barrientos, 2004; Cochon et al., 2004; Hujo & Mcclanahan, 2009). This 
research relates to this debate but approaches it from the angle of redistribution: What determines 
the redistributive potential of social protection measures? How can social protection be 
strengthened as an instrument for redistribution of wealth at the national level? Together the 
issues of financing and redistribution will determine to a great extent the sustainability, ownership 
and impact on inequality of social protection systems. 
This research on redistribution in social protection is executed by HIVA-KU Leuven in the context 
of the BeFinD policy research centre. In the first research phase (2015), HIVA published a 
mapping study into the determinants of the redistributive potential of social protection mechanisms 
in developing countries. The paper draws attention to the importance of the financial, technical and 
socio-political dimension of social protection mechanisms and proposes a theoretical framework that 
visualizes how these dimensions interact and impact on redistribution through social protection 
mechanisms. The paper also noted that donor policies and practices are shifting away from isolated 
programs, towards supporting national social protection systems. To what extent the redistributive 
nature of social protection is an explicit concern in ongoing social protection reforms and in related 
donor interventions remained unclear (Fonteneau & Van Ongevalle, 2015). 
This is where the second research phase picks up the thread. It aims to strengthen the toolbox to 
study the redistributive character of social protection reforms in developing countries, by applying 
the theoretical framework developed in the first phase on real cases. This allows us to both research 
the situation on the ground, and validate and fine-tune the framework at the same time. To do so, it 
marked out case study research into ongoing social protection reforms in two countries, Senegal 
and Morocco. The case studies were conducted between May and September 2016. In the first 
chapter of this report, the research rationale and questions are discussed. This is followed by a second 
chapter that summarizes key observations from the case studies and reflects on what they can mean 
for the understanding of and support to redistributive social protection in developing countries. The 
subsequent fourth and fifth chapter discuss the case studies in detail and offer deeper insights into 
ongoing reforms of social protection in health in Senegal and Morocco respectively. 
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CHAPTER 1 | RESEARCH APPROACH  
1 |  Research approach 
1.1 Research focus  
This research aims to strengthen the toolbox to study the redistributive character of social protection 
reforms in developing countries. Firstly, it investigates, in two cases, ongoing social protection 
reforms, reflects on their potential contribution to redistribution at the national level and discusses 
how the issue of redistribution has been an explicit concern in the technical and financial design, and 
the underlying socio-political process. For reasons explained below, the selected cases are Senegal 
and Morocco, two partner countries of the Belgian development cooperation. Secondly, the study 
provides this in-depth insight in ongoing social protection reforms in health in Senegal and Morocco 
by using the previously developed theoretical framework for analysing the redistributive character of 
social protection reforms. The confrontation of this tri-dimensional theoretical framework with the 
practice on the ground enables its further improvement and validation. This allows us to propose a 
‘tried and tested’ theoretical framework for the analysis of the redistributive potential of social 
protection reforms. Ultimately, the research aims to contribute to a body of knowledge that can 
inform future strategy and policy development for development programmes that seek to support 
redistributive social protection systems.  
This research focus has been unpacked in the following four research questions:  
1. to what extent does the previously developed tri-dimensional theoretical approach indeed 
facilitate and foster an in-depth analysis and understanding of the redistributive nature of a social 
protection system? Do any lessons emerge from the case study that can improve the framework?  
2. what technical and financial choices are shaping social protection systems in Senegal and 
Morocco and how do they affect the redistributive potential?  
3. how did the policy making and implementation process underlying these choices unfold and what 
has been the role of different political and societal actors, including donors?  
4. what can be learned for supporting the mobilization of domestic resources for financing social 
protection and the redistributive potential of social protection systems? 
1.2 Key concepts 
The focal point of this study is the redistributive potential of social protection. Hence, two key 
concepts are ‘social protection’ and ‘redistribution’. 
 Social protection 
There is no consensus on the definition or the scope of social protection. Different authors have 
provided overviews and discussions of the different definitions and components of social protection 
(Adesina, 2010; Devereux & Sabates-Wheeler, 2007, n.d.; Fonteneau, Vaes, & Huyse, 2014). This 
study joins the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) in the following description of social 
protection: ‘Social protection can be defined as the set of all initiatives, both formal and informal, 
that provide social assistance to extremely poor individuals and households; social services to groups 
who need special care or would otherwise be denied access to basic services; social insurance to 
protect people against the risks and consequences of livelihood shocks; and social equity to protect 
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people against social risks such as discrimination or abuse (Devereux & Sabates-Wheeler, 2007; 
Devereux & Barrientos, 2008). 
This definition points out the different components that make up social protection. There are two 
main components: social insurance and social assistance. Social insurance measures consist of 
programmes providing protection against risks arising from life-course contingencies such as 
maternity, old age, disability, work related injuries or sickness; social assistance measures provide 
support to those in poverty. They include various non-contributory cash or in-kind transfer 
programmes for individuals and households. Additionally, employment programmes (food-for-work, 
public works programmes) and labour market programmes (designed to protect workers, such as 
minimum wage legislation and minimising labour related risks) complement the basic components of 
social protection. 
 Redistribution 
Redistribution is considered a key feature and one of the primary objective of social protection, next 
to the protection against risk (Cantillon, Van mechelen, Pintelon, & Van den Heede, 2013), and 
“social protection is undoubtedly the most important tool that welfare states have at their disposal 
for redistributing income” (Cantillon et al., 2013, p. 3). All welfare provision is, by definition, 
redistributive in some way (Cantillon et al., 2013; Spicker, 2011). But, what does redistribution actually 
mean? When can a social protection mechanism be considered more redistributive compared to 
another? In its simplest interpretation, a mechanism or measure is considered redistributive if the 
people who receive goods or services from a measure are not the same as the people who pay. A 
deeper analysis of the redistribution in social protection uncovers some important factors and 
dynamics that can be taken into account. 
Firstly, redistribution can be classified as vertical or horizontal. Vertical redistribution may be 
progressive (from rich to poor) or regressive (from poor to rich). Horizontal redistribution goes from 
one kind of group to another (Spicker, 2011) or, as one could also say, reallocates income across the 
life course (Salverda, Nolvan, & Smeeding, 2009), for example from men to women, from households 
without children to households with children, from young to old. Much of the literature focuses on 
vertical redistribution, and assumes that social protection benefits are intended for the relief of 
poverty. However, in practice redistribution to people on lower incomes is not always the primary 
objective of specific measures (e.g. disability benefits). It is important to also take into account 
horizontal redistribution (Spicker, 2011). 
Secondly, it is most common to look for redistribution at the local or national level, but in fact 
redistribution can happen at all levels: local, sectoral, national, regional and international or 
global. When domestic resources are mobilized to finance social protection at national level, this 
would contribute towards a redistribution of wealth between different groups of a population within 
a given country. When instead external resources play an important role in funding social protection, 
this can be considered as redistribution at a global level. It may be considered problematic from a 
sustainability perspective if financing of social protection in a country is driven by external aid, but 
over the past decade various academics (Ooms, 2011) as well as policymakers (De Schutter & Sepú 
lveda, 2012) have argued in favour of alternative global redistribution mechanisms, such as the 
establishment of global social funds based on redistribution of wealth and cross-subsidisation 
between countries. 
Thirdly, the degree of redistribution triggered by social protection mechanisms can be interpreted 
in a minimalist or a maximalist way. The discussion on ‘universalism’ by Martínez Franzoni & 
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Sánchez-Ancochea (2016) is insightful in this regard, as they use ‘universalist’ as an alternative term 
for ‘redistributive’. They trace the different interpretations of universalism in social policy, which in 
their view could also be referred to as ‘egalitarian social policy’ or ‘redistributive social policy’. Instead, 
they explicitely opt to refer to ‘universalism’, in order to demonstrate how this term with a powerful 
normative value can be given a pragmatic and feasible operationalization (Martínez Franzoni & 
Sánchez-Ancochea, 2016, p. 8). 
They point out that originally universalism in social policy referred to tax-funded programs that 
provided benefits that everyone received as a matter of right. As many middle and low-income 
countries faced major obstacles – for example a large informal sector - to introduce such tax-funded 
citizen-based programs, a more minimalist interpretation of universalism gained ground. In the 
minimalist interpretation, universalism in social policy refers to the ambition to reach everyone even 
when the provided benefits differ. The focus then is on expanding coverage and not on the quality 
and level of the benefits (generosity) or on the even distribution of coverage and benefits across 
beneficiaries (equity). Martínez Franzoni & Sánchez-Ancochea (2016) make the case for a maximalist 
definition that instead includes all three dimensions and defines universalism as a combination of 
coverage, generosity and equity (see figure 1.1). They argue that an arrears in one of these 
dimensions can severely jeopardize the overall redistributive potential of a social protection program 
or system. For example, massive coverage and rights-based access but insignificant benefits, or 
expanding coverage but giving different beneficiary groups access to benefits of different generosity 
are situations where redistribution is crippled. 
Figure 1.1 The triangle of coverage generosity and equity that determines universalism 
 
Source Martínez Franzoni & Sánchez-Ancochea, 2016 
The paradox of redistribution is a first important issue that supports their case. Intuitively one 
would assume that, in order to maximize redistribution, programs should not waste resources on 
people who can live without them. Instead the benefits should be targeted to those in need. However, 
social security research shows that targeting exerts downward pressure on the level of protection 
offered. Or, in other words, programs for the poor become poor programs: under-budgeted, 
institutionally weak and prone to political manipulation. Instead, when middle class is incorporated 
and stands to benefit, the public support for social spending is higher, and middle class will use its 
voice and political capital in favour of the programs. Although limited evidence is available on how 
this paradox behaves in the South, there is sufficient reason to assume that redistribution in the long 
run goes hand in hands with both coverage and generosity (Martínez Franzoni & Sánchez-Ancochea, 
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2016). It should be noted that targeting is not the same as progressivity in contributions or benefits. 
In the case of targeting, benefits will only be accessible for a specific well-defined group of 
beneficiaries. Progressivity is about maintaining a relationship between income level and the size of 
benefits or contributions.  
The influence of the social stratification1 of risks is another important dynamic that needs to be 
taken into account when discussing redistribution. Social stratification of risks means that specific 
risks more commonly occur in specific socio-economic groups of the population or, put differently, 
that socio-economic profile of someone can to some extent predict what risks are more likely. For 
example, unemployment and illness are more frequent in weaker socio-economic groups, whereas 
work-related risks associated with the combination of work and life show a very different social 
stratification. A programme that addresses specific risks will have stronger redistributive and poverty 
reducing effects when those affected by the risk are concentrated in weaker socioeconomic groups. 
This implies that the overall redistributive potential of a programme or a social protection system as 
a whole is also determined by the types of risks it primarily aims it address. Taken into consideration 
the paradox of redistribution, Cantillon et al. (2013, p. 8) state that “it may be expected that downward 
pressures on benefit levels may have been stronger in relation to risks typically affecting vulnerable 
groups (such as long-term unemployment)”. 
1.3 Initial theoretical framework 
Key entry point of this research is the role of social protection as a tool for redistribution at the 
national level. The section above summarizes some considerations that need to be taken into account 
when judging the redistributive character of social protection measures. The next question that arises 
is what determines this redistributive character. Previous research (Fonteneau & Van Ongevalle, 
2015; Hickey, 2008; Lavers & Hickey, 2015) argued that the redistributive potential of a social 
protection system is determined by its financial, technical, and socio-political factors. In phase one 
of the research, the mechanisms at play were summarized in a theoretical framework to analyse the 
redistributive potential of social protection mechanisms, visualized in figure 1.2. 
The socio-political dimension covers the interaction between actors involved in the national policy 
making as well as the influence of global social policy trends and donor policies and practices. The 
former contains: the government (including the Ministries), the political actors and institutions 
(political parties, Parliament, other national institutions), the organised civil society (NGOs, trade 
unions, social movements) and the other ‘unorganised’ social forces (including elites, spontaneous 
popular movements, influential leaders, etc.). From a theoretical perspective, those actors will interact 
in the discussions and decision making process related to the design of social protection policies and 
systems (see second box from the left in figure 1.2). These inter-actions will take place, both formally 
(consultations, elections, propositions, etc.) and informally (lobbying, influencing, etc.).  
The financial dimension refers to the resources that are available and/or to be generated in order to 
fund the different measures that will be part of social protection systems (redistributive or not). In 
order to ensure nationally owned and sustainable social protection systems the mobilisation of these 
resources at the domestic level is crucial. External financial support provided by donors can be seen 
as less relevant from the perspective of redistributive social protection in case it supports the 
implementation of social protection programmes that are temporary and not nationally owned 
because designed and implemented by foreign actors.  
 
1 Social stratification can be understood as the process of ranking individuals and groups of society in different hierarchical socio-
economic strata, based upon their occupation and income, wealth and social status. 
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The technical dimension refers to the more operational side of implementing social protection 
systems, including the type of social protection measures (assistance/insurance/employment and 
universal/targeted), the governance structure, the organisation of service provision. These ‘technical’ 
decisions are often also partly political (Fonteneau, 2015, p. 12-13). 
Additionally, the influence of global factors and international/development cooperation should also 
be taken into account. Global factors include, amongst others, trends in global economy or in 
international social policy that co-shape the context in which national policy processes unfold. 
International cooperation and development cooperation also impact on these policy processes, for 
example support by international organisations, bilateral donors or south-south exchange can play a 
role in how social protection policy is formulated, financed and implemented.  
Figure 1.2 Determinants for redistribution in social protection mechanisms 
 
Source Fonteneau & Van Ongevalle 2015, p. 12 
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CHAPTER 1 | RESEARCH APPROACH 
The remainder of this research will apply this theoretical framework to explore specific social 
protection reforms in two cases. 
1.4 Methodology 
Policy analysis, an inductive approach and case study shape the methodological face of this study.  
 Case studies: Senegal & Morocco 
The need for an in-depth analysis of a highly complex process in which the perspectives of multiple 
actors need to be taken into account, in combination with limited time and resources, supported the 
choice for a case study research design. The case studies should be seen as mostly illustrative, since 
the first objective is to describe policy reforms, which are highly context specific, which makes 
generalisation of any insights difficult. However, the study does hope to inform more general insights 
in the analysis of the socio-political dimension and redistributive potential of social protection 
systems.  
The case selection was based on four criteria. Firstly, to maximize the relevance of the study for 
Belgian development actors, only partner countries of the Belgian development cooperation were 
taken into consideration. Secondly, the countries had to be the scene of major, recent or ongoing 
reforms in social protection. Thirdly, in view of the focus on redistribution, in particular reforms 
towards more universal social protection were of interest. Finally, the availability of policy documents 
and the possibility of efficient data collection during field work also played a role. Initially Morocco, 
Senegal and Rwanda were shortlisted, but the latter risked to be hindered by data collection difficulties 
in the field due to a restrictive political climate. This led to the selection of Senegal and Morocco 
as cases. In both cases these criteria were also used to identify a specific social protection component 
for further investigation. In both cases, this prompted a focus on social protection in health. 
 Policy analysis 
In line with the ambition of gaining better insight specifically in the socio-political dimension of 
redistributive social protection, this study approaches policy as the product of the balance of power 
between political and societal actors interacting on a specific policy topic, and recognizes that these 
actors, all with their own ambitions, agenda’s and objectives, will continue to influence policy during 
the implementation (Crabbé, Gysen, & Leroy, 2006, p. 20-34).  
An inductive approach is used to investigate the different stages of the policy cycle: detect, through 
observation, interesting patterns in how the socio-political dimension of social protection reforms 
determines financial and technical features, as well as the redistributive potential of the resulting social 
protection mechanism. The research focuses mostly on the first three phases of the policy cycle2 as 
described by Crabbé et al. (2006) and De Peuter, De Smedt, & Bouckaert (2007): (1) agenda setting 
and goal setting; (2) policy development, including policy formulation and instrumentation and 
(3) policy implementation.  
Data collection as well as in-case and cross-case analysis and reporting have been guided by a 6-step 
analytic approach (see box below 1.1; see annex 1) which was developed based on the first mapping 
study (Fonteneau & Van Ongevalle, 2015) and insightful research by Hikey (2008) and Hikey and 
Paver (2015). The study consisted of three rounds of data collection: a document analysis (reported 
 
2  See annex 1 for more information about the different stages of the policy cycle. 
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on in an unpublished concept paper, March 2015), field research in May 2016 and September 2016, 
and literature study. These different rounds allowed for an iterative relationship between research 
design, data collection and data analysis.  
Box 1.1 The six-step approach3 for data collection and analysis in case studies 
1. Political and economic country profile = a concise overview of the current political and economic 
landscape.  
2. Snapshot of social protection landscape = mapping the different components of the existing social 
protection landscape, and identifying the components that are the subject of recent or ongoing policy 
reforms.  
3. Reconstruction of the policy cycle = a more in-depth analysis of the recent policy developments in the 
selected domain of social protection.  
4. Analysis of the technical dimension = discussion of the technical features of the mechanism(s) through 
which social protection in the selected domain is/will be implemented.  
5. Analysis of the financial dimension = discussion of the funding options being considered or implemented in 
the concerned mechanism(s).  
6. In-depth actor map per domain = overview and discussion of all actors involved in the process of policy 
development and implementation. 
 Limitations 
This assessment of the redistributive potential of the social protection reforms in the two case studies 
also has important limitations. Firstly, assessing the actual distributive impact of social benefits at a 
national level requires extensive calculations based on detailed data on income pre and post taxation. 
Due to the limited availability of quantitative date and the choice for a qualitative approach, this falls 
outside the scope of this study.  
Secondly, the tax systems underlying the financial architecture of the social protection reforms in the 
case studies have not been investigated extensively. Yet, tax systems do not just affect levels of social 
spending; they also affect the degree of redistribution in tax and benefit systems. This is related to 
the manner in which social programmes are financed through income tax, social security 
contributions, payroll taxes, indirect taxation or other general tax revenue (OECD, 2012b). The 
overall level of the tax burden, the type of taxes, and the degree of progressivity in tax systems, all 
determine the redistributional potential of social protection mechanisms (Adema, Fron, & Ladaique, 
2014). In the study general observations regarding financing sources for the social protection 
mechanisms under scrutiny are taken into account, but do not provide sufficient basis for a 
substantiated assessment of measurable redistributive effects or an in-depth analysis of the tax 
system’s contribution to it.  
Thirdly, the distinction between social protection programs or mechanisms and social protection 
systems is important. The focus in the case studies is on specific mechanisms in one domain of social 
protection: health. Integrating different mechanisms across the different domains of risks into one 
social protection system is an important challenge in most low- and middle income countries. The 
overall redistributive effect of a mechanism can depend on its interplay with other mechanisms in 
the same domain or in other domains. To assess the redistributive potential of the overall system, 
one will need to take into account all its components, how they are coordinated and how they interact. 
This is beyond the scope of this study, although the existence of a process or a plan to evolve towards 
a redistributive social protection system was taken into account. 
 
3  A more detailed elaboration of the analytical framework is provided in annex 1. 
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Finally, the study is situated on the overlap between several well-developed research traditions. An 
exhaustive literature review of these different strands in literature was beyond the scope of this study. 
The literature review focused instead on those contributions addressing the development of social 
(protection) policy in developing countries, although several contributions from the literature on 
social policy development and effects in welfare states, or the literature on policy change in general 
were also taken into account. The data collection for the case studies happened between March 2016 
and December 2016. As is to be expected with ongoing reforms, the situation on the ground has 
been evolving since. 
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2 |  Assessing redistributive potential: key insights 
The previous chapter presented three important ingredients in this study. Firstly, the discussion of 
the concept of redistribution in social protection (section 1.4) highlighted several considerations that 
need to be taken into account when assessing redistribution. These include the balance between 
coverage, generosity and equity; the risks associated with targeting including the paradox of 
redistribution; and the degree of vertical versus horizontal redistribution. Secondly, the previously 
developed theoretical framework argued that a good understanding of how a social protection 
mechanisms perform in these areas, demands insight in their technical, financial, and socio-political 
features (section 1.1). Finally, a step-wise approach for data collection and analysis was proposed, and 
has been applied in the collection and analysis of data on ongoing social protection reforms in the 
heath sector in the two case studies, Senegal and Morocco. This chapter brings together the key 
insights that emerged. 
2.1 Case study summary 
In the case of Morocco, the adoption of Law 65.00 in 2002 on Basic Medical Coverage initiated the 
introduction of a mandatory health insurance (AMO) for the formal sector and the establishment of 
a medical assistance scheme for the economically destitute (RAMED). In the case of Senegal, the 
Senegalese health ministry launched a strategy for the extension of social protection in health in 2013, 
with the ‘Extension of the health coverage through mutual health organisations in the context of 
decentralisation’ or DECAM as one of the key pillars. Using the theoretical framework, the technical, 
financial, institutional and political features of the mechanisms that these reforms introduced were 
investigated. A brief summary is provided below.  
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Senegal 
The extension of the health coverage 
through mutual health organisations in 
the context of decentralisation or 
DECAM in Senegal since 2013 shows 
the following key features: 
Technical dimension 
 Voluntary health insurance 
 Universal but designed for the 
informal sector 
 Contributory but subsidized 
through tax ressources 
 Free access for poor and vulnerable 
Institutional 
 Implemented through (newly 
established) community based 
mutual health organisations 
 Managed by the new Agency for 
Universal Health Coverage 
 Junctions between government 
actors, local authorities and MHOs 
crucial but still unclear 
Financial 
 Funded mainly through tax-
incomes and donor support 
 Mid-term and long-term 
sustainability problematic 
 Considering different financial 
options, but no clear financial plan 
Political 
 International agenda and 
presidential push were crucial 
 Important role of donors 
 Conservative move of trade unions 
and limited input by CSOs 
 Policy process partially informal 
and driven by key individuals 
Morocco 
The extension of a basic medical 
coverage through AMO and RAMED in 
Morocco since 2002 shows the following 
key features: 
Technical dimension 
 Separate mechanisms per target 
groups leading to fragmentation 
 Mandatory health insurance (AMO) 
giving access to services in public 
and private sector 
 Health assistance (RAMED) giving 
access to services only in specific 
region and in public sector 
 Both contributory, but in RAMED 
the extreme poor are exempted 
from contributing 
Institutional 
 AMO managed by former mutual 
health organisations with strong 
union representation 
 National Agency for Health 
Insurance (ANAM) as regulator but 
with limited enforcing power 
 In practice no regulator or manager 
for RAMED, but topic of 
discussion 
Financial 
 AMO funded by employers and 
employees. Reimbursements go 
mainly to private health sector 
 RAMED insufficiently financed by 
state, local communities and 
beneficiaries 
Political 
 Important role change agents in 
administration & King 
 Role donors is not very visible, but 
provide important technical support 
 Strong influence of trade unions 
and limited input by CSOs 
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2.2 Minimalist interpretation of redistribution 
Observation 
In both case studies, a balanced maximalist interpretation of redistribution does not feature prominently on 
the agenda of the national policy makers developing or reforming their social protection systems, nor on the 
agenda of financial and technical partners supporting these reforms. Efforts are ongoing in the areas of 
coverage, generosity of benefits and equity of access but there is a strong focus on expanding coverage. A 
better balance with generosity of benefits and equity of access is not explicitly and prominently pursued.  
Recommendation for development actors 
Initiate and/or support a transparent reflection on the redistributive potential of different social protection 
policy options and on the trade-offs being made between coverage, generosity and equity. This can promote 
a more holistic, balanced interpretation of redistribution in social protection and can avoid a too one-sided 
and technocratic focus on expanding coverage. 
In both cases, the social protection reforms in health represent a rather minimalist interpretation of 
universalism and redistribution. The ongoing reforms in both Senegal and Morocco show a strong 
emphasis on expanding coverage. In the case of Morocco, the mandatory health insurance (AMO) 
for salary workers has been expanded to family members of beneficiaries, students, and pensioners. 
The introduction of health insurance for free professions and the self-employed is ongoing. In 2012 
Morocco also opted for the generalization of its health assistance RAMED. In brief, key steps 
forward have been centred around coverage, although efforts are also being made in other areas, for 
example the improvement of benefits and services for some target groups, or the introduction of 
better data collection and management practices. In the case of Senegal, boosting coverage seems to 
be the leitmotif of its reform in social protection in health. President Macky Sall got elected on his 
promise to increase coverage from 20% of the population in 2012 to 75% in 2017. The voluntary 
universal health insurance, currently being introduced, has the ambition to address the coverage gap 
in the informal sector. Over the past years the government reported figures of coverage have gone 
up spectacularly, but they are not accompanied by a critical assessment (or even collection of data for 
such an assessment) of the actual benefits accessed and the equity in access.  
Of course the expansion of coverage represents undeniable progress. However, in both cases, these 
swift evolutions in coverage are not matched by the evolutions in the generosity of benefits or 
the equity of access. For example, in the fragmented Moroccan system, beneficiaries of the health 
insurance (AMO) get freedom of choice with regard to the health care facilities they make use of, 
whereas beneficiaries of the health assistance (RAMED) are limited to the public health care 
infrastructure, where they may find that the health service they need is not available, forcing them to 
pay out-of-pocket in a private clinic anyway. This example also demonstrates the two aspects of 
generosity: on the one hand generosity refers to the scope of the benefits being offered, on the other 
hand it also covers their actual quality. In theory RAMED provides free access to a very broad 
package of health services in the public health sector, but health infrastructure is distributed 
geographically unevenly, and the public health care facilities are not being payed sufficiently to 
provide these services. Hence, the actual supply of qualitative health services is in practice limited. In 
the case of Morocco, the clear priority that has been given to improving social protection in health 
for the formal sector, while the expansion of RAMED was postponed for years, also demonstrates 
the unbalance with regard to equity. In the case of Senegal the challenge of matching coverage with 
the scope and quality of health services may be even more acute. Without expanding and improving 
the supply of health services across the country, efforts to implement universal health insurance will 
be void (and may, in the long run, damage the public support for and confidence in any type of health 
insurance).  
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Both cases also demonstrate some of the dilemma’s related to targeting. In theory Senegal’s 
DECAM implements a universal health insurance, but in practice it is designed specifically for the 
informal sector. Although one can argue that formal sector workers may benefit indirectly when their 
extended family members no longer rely on them for their health care, they draw no visible direct 
benefit. However, the system is for more than half tax-funded. There clearly is a transfer of resources, 
and hence redistribution, but the paradox of redistribution warns us that the longer-term implications 
may be limited public and political support. This is all too visible in the case of RAMED in Morocco. 
The RAMED health assistance is targeted only at the poor and vulnerable, has struggled for years to 
build sufficient political and public support and is still financially and institutionally weak. 
Additionally there are also many issues related to the operationalization of targeting. How to 
determine who gets access and who doesn’t get access? In the case of RAMED for example, a 
minimal difference in monthly income can make the difference between free access through RAMED 
or no health coverage whatsoever, and this raises fairness issues.  
By developing specific mechanisms for specific beneficiary groups the potential for vertical 
redistribution becomes less developed than the potential for horizontal redistribution. For 
example, in the case of Senegal, DECAM is designed for the informal sector and hence the 
heterogeneity of the insured beneficiaries will be low. The mechanism will mostly cover rural, 
informal workers confronted with similar precarious working conditions and livelihood risks. 
Although the attempt of providing social protection for health in the informal sector is very laudable, 
one should also point out that this goal could have also been achieved by including these beneficiaries 
in the health insurance mechanisms of the formal sector, which could have had a far bigger 
redistributive effect.  
Looking at the discourse present in these policy processes on social protection in health or the 
development cooperation supporting these process, the research did not come across clear references 
to redistribution in either of the cases. Although some references to equality and social justice in 
general terms can be found, national governments and financial and technical partners don’t clarify 
their understanding of and position to redistribution in a concrete manner. Hence, it remains unclear 
to what extent they actually aim to promote redistribution through social protection, and if so, how 
they interpret and operationalize this objective. Initiating or supporting a more transparent reflection, 
including on the trade-offs being made between coverage, generosity and equity, could promote a 
more holistic interpretation and implementation of redistribution in social protection. 
2.3 Indispensable political dimension 
Observation 
Politics are indispensable for understanding social protection policy in low- and middle income countries, and 
for assessing how the development of redistributive social protection can be supported. Investigating this 
political dimension requires awareness of the driving role of political settlements, the role of both formal and 
informal power dynamics and institutions, the role of international and transnational actors, and the role of 
ideas. There is very little publicly available evidence to show that technical and financial partners supporting 
social protection reforms are aware and currently engage with these dynamics. 
Recommendation 
Institutions matter for development and behind institutions lie politics. Efforts to support redistributive social 
protection need to be politically-smart. This requires a strong analysis of the political environment in which a 
social protection mechanism is put on the agenda, operationalised and implemented, as well as the 
development of clear strategies on how to engage with these political dynamics and how to enable the own 
organization to do so. 
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Different scholars point out that the research on social protection policy in low and middle income 
countries focuses on definitional debates, policy design and effectiveness, and pays relatively limited 
attention to the politics that shape these policies (Barrientos, 2013; Bender, 2013; Haggard & 
Kaufman, 2008; Lavers & Hickey, 2015, 2016). However, the awareness of the importance of 
politics in understanding social protection policy in low and middle income countries is growing 
(Barrientos & Hulme, 2010; Béland, 2011; Bender, 2013, 2017; Devereux & Sabates-Wheeler, 2008; 
Hickey, 2008; John & Putzel, 2009; Khan, 2010; Lavers & Hickey, 2015). Lavers and Hickey (2016 
p. 389) argue “that politics need to be at the centre of efforts to understand social protection in low 
income countries and the evident variation in country experience.”  
Lavers and Hickey point out that the literature on politics in development agrees that “political 
bargaining among elites, and between elites and non-elite factions, leads to the establishment of a 
‘political settlement’, which then closely shapes processes of institutional design and the redistribution 
of resources within society” (Lavers & Hickey, 2016, p. 389). This ‘political settlement’ approach 
interprets social protection as one of the means that different powerful and organized groups use to 
ensure political and social stability in a way that serves their interests. In that respect, social protection 
can be seen as the glue as well as the result of a deal or ‘settlement’ between these groups. The 
‘political settlements’ approach also presumes that in less industrialized contexts groups tend to be 
shapes by a variety of identities, including ethnicities, region and religion, and hence political elites 
can relate to these factions on a patron-client basis. This underscores the importance of power 
dynamics and informal politics and institutions in such contexts. Applying this to the understanding 
of social protection reforms, the authors argue that such processes of negotiation lead to the 
formation of policy coalitions, or coalitions of actors, ideas and interests, that support specific 
problem formulations and policy solutions (for a figure of the framework, see annex 2). This has 
interesting implications. Firstly, it means different social protection policy proposals will be supported 
by different coalitions, and hence strengthening the position of specific actors or interest groups will 
also affect what coalition dominates and which policy option prevails. Secondly, it means that 
moments of instability create space for policy change, during which social protection could be a 
means to improve stability. Thirdly, it also implies that different types of political settlements will, 
depending on how the gained their mandate, be susceptible to different types of drivers (e.g. votes, 
public support, patronage, military power, international legitimacy, …). But, in the end, political 
survival will most often trump long-term interests of the wider population (Byiers, Berliner, 
Guadagno, & Takeuchi, 2015). 
This approach has been useful for exploring, for example, why the reforms in Senegal and Morocco 
unfolded when they did: after a new government coalition came to power in Morocco and after a 
new president was elected in Senegal. Such instances can be seen as the window of opportunity for 
different groups to engage in the negotiation of a settlement about the redistribution of resources, a 
negotiation that will be determined and will determine the institutional landscape. It also increases 
insight in why specific options were selected. For example strong existing institutions and strong 
interest groups, such as the mutual health organizations for the public and private sector in Morocco, 
or the trade unions represented in the bipartite social security institutions for the formal sector in 
Senegal, determined the scope of the reform by vetoing fundamental changes that would affect their 
own position. Such resistance of powerful actors can limit the policy space for change to areas or 
options where the established interests are less strong. In both cases, but especially in the case of 
Morocco, this leads to an increase of fragmentation in the short term. On the other hand, one can 
also argue that such ‘conservative’ position of interest groups safeguards existing social protection 
mechanisms from becoming overstretched or eroded, especially in situations where the commitment 
for developing robust financing social protection remains weak.  
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An element that needs to be taken into account is the role of international and transnational actors. 
Bender et al. (2014, p. 4) see extensive social protection reforms as a global phenomenon, as over the 
past two decades many low and middle income countries, in Africa, Asia, Latin America, have been 
the scene of reforms introducing, extending or improving social protection. The authors also stress 
that this global phenomenon is not uniform across countries, and that domestic factors are 
insufficient to explain this diversity. They argue that apart from domestic factors, these policy changes 
are also attributed to international influences and interdependencies. Policy transfer and policy 
diffusion4 are important dynamics in this regard (Bender, Keller, & Willing, 2014). In the case of 
Senegal, this can be illustrated by the introduction of the Bolsa Familia-inspired Family Security 
Grants after a study visit of Senegalese officials to Brazil, or by interviewees’ frequent references to 
social policy reforms in Rwanda and Ghana when reflecting on the strengths, weaknesses and 
possible ways forward for the Senegalese approach. Lavers and Hickey further also stress the 
importance of transnational actors in this regard. The case studies support this argument. In line 
with what Lavers and Hickey (2016) point out, global policy networks and epistemic communities5 
in support of social protection built by transnational actors have co-shaped the national social 
protection policies. In the case of Senegal, this can be illustrated by the strong influence of the 
‘universal health coverage’ agenda spearheaded by the World Health Organisation, as well as the rise 
of social protection on the international agenda. Interviewees indicate that these transnational 
processes have played a key role in the agenda setting of health coverage, leading to the ongoing 
reform in Senegal. It is also demonstrated by the consensus that was built around the role of mutual 
health organization in delivering the envisioned universal health insurance in Senegal. In this process, 
the role of key individuals that have, for decades, been part of transnational networks devoted to 
mutualisms, and the influence of the policy input developed by these networks at regional and 
international level were instrumental in the selection of DECAM as the most desired policy option.  
Another element that, according to Lavers and Hickey (2016), remains underexposed in existing 
literature on social protection policy in developing context is the role of ideas. Others point out the 
importance of mental models, culture, values and norms (Bender, 2017). In brief, attitudes toward 
social policy and redistribution are influenced by beliefs about the respective responsibility of 
individual, society and state, as well as by the attitudes towards the poor, the existence or absence of 
an insurance culture, or religious aspects. Although it was beyond the scope of the case studies to 
look extensively for more evidence of the link between ideas and the social protection policy, some 
examples emerged. In Morocco for example high level officials stated they considered it normal for 
those who are productive and contribute to the economy to have more freedom of choice in the 
health services they use, whereas those depending on the state can make no claim to the same services 
and should accept what they are given. In Senegal, different interviewees indicated that the success 
of the voluntary health insurance may be hindered by the belief that taking insurance can call down 
misfortune upon oneself, while different experts also stated that the support for a mandatory 
 
4  Policy transfer can be defined as “the process, by which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and 
ideas in one political system (past or present) is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and 
ideas in another political system” (Dolowitz & March, 2000, cited in Bender et.al. (2014, p.11). Policy diffusions can be understood as 
“the process whereby policy choices in one unit are influenced by policy choices in other units” (Maggetti & Gilardi, 2013 cited in 
Bender et.al. 2014, p.13). Policy diffusion is about communication and the spread of policy (innovation) between different 
interdependent policy units, which can be situated at any level from the local to the transnational. 
5  Epistemic communities are groups of professionals, often from a variety of different disciplines, which produce policy-relevant 
knowledge about complex technical issues. Such communities embody a belief system around an issue which contains four 
knowledge elements: [1] a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, which provide a value-based rationale for the social action 
of community members; [2] shared causal beliefs, which are derived from their analysis of practices leading or contributing to a 
central set of problems in their domain and which then serve as the basis for elucidating the multiple linkages between possible policy 
actions and desired outcomes; [3] shared notions of validity – that is, intersubjective, internally defined criteria for weighing and 
validating knowledge in the domain of their expertise; and [4] a common policy enterprise – that is, a set of common practices 
associated with a set of problems to which their professional competence is directed, presumably out of the conviction that human 
welfare will be enhanced as a consequence (Haas, 1992). 
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insurance was limited because this constitutes a too intrusive state interference in the individual 
sphere. 
In both cases, a closer look at the role of (bilateral and international) technical and financial partners 
yields very little trace of explicit political analysis. Although it can be assumed that governmental 
and non-governmental development actors include domestic politics in their context analyses and 
programme design processes, it remains unclear how comprehensive and solid these considerations 
of the political dimension are, and to what extent actual strategies for engaging with these dynamics 
are developed and implemented.  
In fact, this is an issue in development cooperation in general. As is stated in the Doing Development 
Differently Manifesto (2016): “(…) genuine development progress is complex: solutions are not 
simple or obvious, those who would benefit most lack power, those who can make a difference are 
disengaged and political barriers are too often overlooked. Many development initiatives fail to 
address this complexity (…)”. At the same time many contributions by academics and development 
practitioners alike support the analysis that without taking into account complexity and politics, 
development cooperation will always underperform (Hall, Cleaver, Franks, & Maganga, 2013; 
Hudson, Marquette, & Waldock, 2016; Menocal, 2014; ODI, 2016; Ramalingam & Bound, 2016). 
The challenge this presents is nicely summarized by Menocal (2014) “one of the most important 
lessons to emerge in international development over the past two decades is that institutions matter, 
and that behind institutions lie politics. (…) What is needed is a shift not only to think politically but 
also to work differently. This means asking hard-hitting questions about how change happens; the 
role external actors play in supporting that change; and what sorts of programme approaches, funding 
and staffing are needed as a result.”  
These insights present significant challenges for the general practice of development actors. 
Specifically for aiding social protection reforms, they support the need for a strong analysis of the 
broader political (policy coalitions, stakeholders, power balances and dynamics, transnational actors, 
ideas and mental models), technical (effects of implementation and operationalization choices on 
coverage, generosity, equity), institutional (power, capacity issues, coordination issues) and financial 
(fiscal architecture, financial feasibility) environment in which social protection policy are being 
introduced. This analysis should then trigger a strategizing exercise on how to engage with these 
dynamics and what is needed to enable the development actors to put these strategies in practice. 
2.4 Patchy stakeholder participation 
Observation 
Although some possibilities for participation in the development of social policy may exist, the actual 
involvement of stakeholders is limited: not all stakeholders are included and/or their possibilities for actually 
influencing policy are restricted. This has to do with a reductive interpretation of what stakeholders are 
relevant and a lack of proactive stakeholder engagement on the one hand. On the other hand, stakeholders, 
and specifically civil society organisations, don’t have social protection prominently on their radar or lack 
capacity and expertise to engage in the policy process in a meaningful way.  
Recommendation 
Supporting the involvement of all stakeholders in social protection policy processes contributes to a 
comprehensive and shared assessment of the social protection situation on the ground and promotes a wider 
debate on the policy options to move forward. This is important for the development and implementation of  
suitable and feasible policy options that enjoy public support. Providing tools to guide such stakeholder 
participation (e.g. the assessment-based national dialogue) or strengthening capacity of stakeholders to 
participate can contribute to this.  
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Civil society organizations can play an important and multifaceted role in improving social 
protection, and often do so. Their contribution can pertain to the introduction, experimentation and 
implementation of social protection mechanisms, but also in building coherent social protection 
systems at national level (Fonteneau et al., 2014, 2014; Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2015; Hudson et al., 
2016; Taylor-Gooby, 2016; Vaes, Fonteneau, & Van Ongevalle, 2016). However, in both cases only 
a fragment of the civil society did actively take part in the policy formulation process on the expansion 
of social protection in health. 
In the case of Senegal, the mutual health organisations supported by influential resources figures (in 
several cases with a fine record in development agencies or international organisations) played a 
significant role. The trade unions concentrated on the reforms targeting the formal sector and did 
played a far less active role in the development and operationalization of DECAM, as it was to focus 
on the informal sector and hence outside their core business. Other civil society organisations felt 
side-lined in the policy process, or lacked expertise to strongly position themselves. They did take 
note of this important development and the need to engage on the topic. Attempts are being made 
to build policy influence on the topic, for example by collecting grassroots feedback to guide the next 
policy cycle. 
In the case of Morocco, events unfolded similarly. The trade unions initially played an important role 
in creating policy space for RAMED but then focused their efforts on influencing AMO, the formal 
sector component. They have been a stalwart in the further development and operationalisation of 
AMO. Other civil society organisations indicate they have difficulty gaining access to the policy 
process. One explanation is that available government funding for CSOs is not directed towards the 
domain of social protection policy and hence few CSOs have built expertise and experience. 
International organisations and bilateral donors also focus on trade unions whenever involving civil 
society, and implicate other CSOs far less. An exception to this rule have been the professional 
associations (e.g. of doctors, pharmacists) who have participated actively in policy formulation and 
negotiation.  
In both cases, the policy processes preceding the ongoing reforms did not proactively seek to 
mobilize different stakeholders and include them in the debates and policy decision on social 
protection reforms. Instead, participation was reduced to the usual suspects. This was also possible 
because other actors, although representing important constituencies, did not have the expertise and 
capacity to spot this important policy reform in time, to gain access to the process and provide 
meaningful input. The assessment-based national dialogue approach promoted by the ILO 
provides a tool to address these constraints (ILO, 2016). It is a way to take stock of existing social 
protection realities in order to understand what elements of a basic national social protection floor 
are in place, where “holes” in floors exist. It takes an explicitly participatory approach to the 
identification of priority policy options for the successful and coordinated development of nationally 
defined social protection floors. This means all relevant stakeholders, including line ministries, local 
government bodies, workers’ and employers’ organizations, civil society organizations, academics, 
and development partners, should be involved from the outset. Working with stakeholders who have 
sufficient political power and technical expertise is critical to avoid future blockages in the process 
(ILO, 2016, p. 44). 
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2.5 Useful theoretical framework 
Observation 
The proposed theoretical framework facilitates the analysis of redistribution in social protection mechanisms 
and reforms but it needed an institutional dimension and a better reflection of the importance of the political 
dimension. The framework has been revised accordingly. 
Recommendation 
Using the proposed theoretical framework in combination with the insights presented above can assist in a 
more comprehensive and realistic assessment of the redistributive potential of a specific social protection 
mechanisms. It will also allow to determine important obstacles or levers for promoting more redistribution. 
The case studies confirm the value of the conceptual framework put forward at the beginning of this 
study but have also shown that it may lack an institutional dimension and does not fully reflect the 
importance of the political dimension. Four adjustments bring us to propose the following, adapted, 
visual of the conceptual framework (see figure 2.1). 
Figure 2.1 Conceptual framework: determinants of redistribution in social protection 
 
Source Adapted from Fonteneau & Van Ongevalle (2016) 
Firstly, in both case studies, politics have been key to understand the policy space, the selection of 
specific policy options, the ups and downs in the implementation. In that sense, the political 
dimension is dominant, and present in all other dimensions as well.  
Secondly, apart from the technical choices with regard to mechanisms, target groups, targeting 
approaches, service packages, data collection, etc., the institutional set-up responsible for the 
implementation, management, regulation and monitoring and evaluation of social protection 
mechanisms is of importance. The initial conceptual framework included this in the technical 
dimension, but we now propose to present it as a separate dimension. As the observations from the 
case studies have shown, the institutional dimension, and in particular the relative power and 
mandates of the different institutions involved, the coordination between them, and the 
representation of different actors within them, can affect the implementation of social protection 
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policy and its contribution to redistribution. Including this as a separate dimension also brings in an 
actor-focus, which supports the analysis of the political dimension.  
Thirdly, the original conceptual framework emanated a certain logical chronology, from politics 
setting the scene for technical choices and financial considerations to come to the technical nitty 
gritty of implementation. The cases show that this chronology does not always reflect reality. The 
case of Senegal showed that technical choices are not always preceded or flanked by clear financial 
decisions, and that specific technical mechanisms can be adopted without much policy discussion or 
institutional embedding (e.g. the Family Security Grants inspired by Bolsa Familia). The case of 
Morocco showed how the existing institutional dimension can affect politics and determines the 
feasibility of specific technical options. In brief, the interplay between these different dimensions 
should not be seen as linear but as a continuous dynamic in which beginning and end are difficult to 
differ.  
A fourth aspect to be included in the conceptual framework is the importance of the interplay 
between the different dimensions. Choosing for a technically redistributive mechanism is an 
important step, but it will be equally important that the financial architecture and institutional set-up 
support this. When decisions in all dimensions work together, the potential for redistribution can be 
maximized. The framework can help this pursuit for balance by uncovering gaps and obstacles for 
redistribution, and by highlighting possible forces and levers for advancing redistribution. 
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3 |  Case study 1: Senegal 
Population: 13, 97 million (2015) 
Area: 196,722 sq. km  
Languages: French, Wolof, Pulaar, Jola, Mandinka 
Religion: Muslim (95, 4%), Christian (4, 2%), animist (0, 4%) 
Life expectance: 61,3 (2015) 
Dependency ratio6: 87, 6% (2015) 
Informal sector: 40 - 60% of GDP (2015) 
Corruption Perception Index Ranking: 64/176 (2016) 
(Transparency International 2016; CIA World fact book 2015) 
3.1 Political and economic country profile  
Recent developments in the field of social protection did not happen in a political or economic 
vacuum. Different political and economic factors set the scene.  
Politically, Senegal can be viewed as one of the most stable countries in Africa, where pluralism and 
democratic institutions have been progressively strengthened since its independence in 1960. Since 
then the country has gone through three peaceful political transitions with four presidents: Leopold 
Sedar Senghor (1960-1980), Abdou Diouf (1981-2000), Abdoulaye Wade (2000-2012), and since 
March 2012, Macky Sall. The next presidential election is expected in 2019 and legislative elections 
are planned for 2017. 
Macky Sall came into power after winning the second voting round with around 65% of the votes 
from Abdoulaye Wade. Long-time members of the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS), both 
politicians were for a long time on the same political line and Sall served as Prime Minister under 
Wade from 2004 to 2007. After a conflict with Wade, Sall founded his own party and joined the 
opposition. When Sall’s successful bid for presidency ended the 12 year rule of Wade, he opted to 
make social protection one of his spear points and linked it to a promise with a firm deadline: “(…) 
d’atteindre au moins 75% de couverture maladie de base de la population sénégalaise à l’horizon 
2017” (Sall, 2013). This was a break with Wade’s political agenda: overall Wade had had less attention 
for social protection, with social protection rising on the political agenda mostly at the end of his 
presidency. 
Several economic factors need to be taken into account to understand recent social protection 
developments. Senegal has the fourth largest economy in the West African sub-region and aspires to 
become an emerging country by 2035. In 2015, the World Bank reported it remained stuck in a low-
growth equilibrium since 2006, with an average far behind on the average growth at Sub-Saharan 
level. 2014 may have been a tipping point: the economic growth began to trend upward. Over the 
course of 2015, Senegal’s macroeconomic performance has been strong with a growth rate of 6.5%, 
 
6  The number of individuals that are likely to be economically “dependent” on the support of others. 
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a rate that hasn’t been achieved since 2003, making Senegal now the second fastest growing economy 
in West Africa, behind Côte d’Ivoire.  
The industrial sector and the service sector contribute most to the GDP and have good growth rates, 
especially the construction, telecom and banking sectors are currently drivers of economic growth. 
However, the industrial and the service sector employ less than a fifth of the population. Although 
the smallest contributor to the GDP, the agricultural sector employs the majority of the population 
and is the primary source of employment in rural areas.7 The sector has witnessed several setbacks 
due to low rainfall and over-exploitation of fish stocks. Better weather conditions and the growing 
production in horticulture are expected to give the sector a boost in the medium term. In search for 
inclusive growth, Senegal attempts to support productivity and growth in the agriculture sector. This 
rationale supports the provision of subsidies to farmers, but also the extensions of health coverage 
in rural areas. With healthier workers and less lost days due to i.e. malaria, the agricultural sector could 
become more productive. 
A very substantive informal economy cuts across the different economic sectors. According to a 2011 
census, 48,8% of the active labour force is employed in the non-agricultural informal sector (ANSD, 
2013, p. 9). In the agricultural sector, the main employer in de country, that rate amounts to almost 
100%. The share of the informal sector in value addition in agriculture and forestry is close to 100% 
(ECA, 2015) and the informal sector’s contribution to GDP is estimated between 40% and 60% (CIA 
2016). Despites its important contribution to the gross domestic product, the social protection 
coverage in the informal sector is minimal. On the other hand, informal sector workers currently do 
not systematically contribute to government resources through taxation. This study did not come 
across a clear strategy on how to address this issue or a strategy including social protection as a tool 
for formalization of the informal sector8.  
According to a 2011 poverty household survey, poverty remains high at 46.7% of the population and 
the drop in number of poor has stagnated, or may even have risen during the 2006-2011 period 
(World Bank, 2015; IMF, 2013). Its most recent GINI coefficient (2011), measuring the degree of 
inequality in the distribution of family income in a country, designated Senegal as the 60th most 
unequal country out of 144 with a GINI of 40.3 (CIA World Fact book 2016). Poverty, inequality 
and the lack of social protection in the informal sector explain why Senegal wrestles with a high 
transfer of revenue from middle class individuals with a stable income to their (extended) family 
members. This type of informal solidarity with the extended family prevents middle class from saving. 
Without the savings of its citizens, the Senegalese government has to resort to loans from 
external/foreign lenders, which is far more expensive. At the Ministry for Economy and Finance, the 
logic goes that if basic social protection coverage would improve, the need for informal solidarity 
would decrease, savings and hence internal loan capacity would go up, giving the government better 
access to resources.  
Several important recent policy initiatives set the scene for the recent developments in social 
protection. Macro-economic policy is currently guided by the ‘emerging Senegal plan’ (Plan Sénégal 
émergent or PSE) that aims to turn Senegal into an emerging economy by 2035. The first 
implementation period runs from 2014 till 2018, and the first set of 14 of the 27 flagship projects and 
5 of the 17 major reforms of the PSE were launched in 2014. For its first implementation period, the 
 
7  Agriculture’s contribution to GDP was estimated approx. 17% (2015 estimates) whereas industry and services stood at approx. 24 and 
58% respectively. According to 2007 estimates the former covers about 77% of the active labor force and the latter about 22% (CIA 
World Fact book 2016). 
8  This is on the agenda of the ILO but only since recently and so far it is not accompanied by clear operational approach. Also, the 
Ministry of Labour, ILO’s the main interlocutor, is not in charge of social protection in health. 
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PSE is organised around three topics: structural transformation of the economy and growth; human 
capital, social protection and sustainable development; and governance, institutions, peace and 
security (Republique du Senegal, 2014). Additionally, Senegal also has a Decent Work Country 
Programme covering the period of 2012 to 2015 that recognized i.e. the limited coverage for the 
formal sector, no coverage for the informal sector, and unequal access to social protection for men 
and women as important challenges. Consequently, the reinforcement and extension of social 
protection was identified as one of two priority areas for intervention (ILO & République du Senegal, 
2012). Also shaping the broader policy context for social protection policy, is the development of a 
long-term strategy for territorial development, the ‘Plan national d’aménagement et de 
développement territorial’ (PNADT 2015-35) and the adoption in 2013 of the Decentralisation 
Act III. The decentralization of the public sector has been ongoing since 1970 and has also impacted 
on the governance in the health sector (Tine, Hatt, Faye, & Nakhimovsky, 2014). 
3.2 Snapshot of social protection landscape 
The 2014-2015 World Social Protection Report (ILO, 2014) summarized the state of social security 
around the world. For Senegal it showed a significant increase in social protection expenditure over 
the past 15 years. However, the overall social protection system is considered underdeveloped and 
presenting significant gaps. Assessing existing legislation in Senegal on its attention for social 
protection in the different domains of sickness, maternity, old age, employment injury, invalidity, 
survivors, family allowances, and unemployment, ILO only traced ‘limited’ legal coverage. In 
particular with regard to unemployment and invalidity it did not detect any relevant legislation.  
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Table 3.1 Overview of social protection coverage in Senegal 
*  Managing institutions: Caisse de Sécurité Sociale (CSS), Centres de Protection Maternelle et Infantile (PMI), 
Centres de Santé à Soins Obstétricaux d’Urgence (SSOU), Institution de Coordination de l’Assurance 
Maladie Obligatoire (ICAMO), Institutions de Prévoyance Maladie (IPM), Institutions de Prévoyance 
Retraite (IPRES), Caisse autonome de Prévoyance Social Universelle (CAPSU), National Retirement Fund 
(FNR), Private Sector pension Scheme (IPRES), Mutual Health Organisations (MHO) and Agence de la 
Couverture de Maladia Universelle (ACMU), Fonds de Solidarité Nationale (FSN), Délégation générale à la 
protection sociale et à la solidarité nationale (DGPSN). 
*  Provisions highlighted in orange are contributory. Other provisions are either fully employer-funded or tax-
funded. 
*  Other domains covered by the ILO definition of social protection include death and disability. With regard 
to the former, no clear mechanisms were mapped. The latter is subject of ongoing reforms, but a detailed 
description is beyond the scope of this study. 
Source CLEISS, 2015b; Ministère de la Santé et de l’Action Sociale, 2013 
In the existing social protection system salary workers in the formal sector are best off, with access 
to social insurance that covers risks related to birth, health, work accidents or sickness, invalidity 
and old age. There are two pension systems: public sector employees are covered by the National 
Retirement Fund (FNR), private sector workers are covered by the Private Sector Pension Scheme 
Target group Formal 
sector: 
civil servants  
Formal 
sector: 
salary 
workers  
Formal 
sector: 
self-
employed 
Informal 
sector 
Vulnerable 
groups: 
+60, -5, 
pregnant 
women & 
students 
Area of risk 
Birth Mandatory 
insurance >> 
cash maternity 
benefits (CCS)  
Mandatory 
insurance >> 
cash maternity 
benefits (CSS)  
No No Medical 
assistance: free 
prenatal 
consultations, 
vaccination 
new born, 
post-natal 
follow-up and 
caesareans  
Family 
allowances 
Yes Yes No No Program for 
Family 
Security 
Grants (BSF) 
with 
conditional 
cash transfers 
Work (injuries, 
illness, disability, 
& death) 
Mandatory 
insurance 
Mandatory 
insurance 
Voluntary 
insurance 
(CSS) 
No No 
Work 
(unemployment) 
No No No No No 
Health Mandatory 
insurance 
(fixed budget 
item) 
Mandatory 
insurance 
(ICAMO & 
IPM) 
Voluntary 
health 
insurance 
(MHO) 
Voluntary 
health 
insurance 
(MHO & 
ACMU, 
DGPSN) 
Free health 
care 
Old age Mandatory 
insurance 
(FNR) 
Mandatory 
insurance 
(IPRES) 
No No No 
Natural Disasters Emergency relief (FSN) 
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(IPRES). For health coverage too different mandatory employer-based systems for public sector and 
private sector employees are in place. The former are covered by health insurance funded from the 
general government budget and overseen by the Ministry of Finance. In order to reduce out-of-
pocket payment for workers, a number of public sector agencies have also implemented their own 
complementary health insurance scheme to cover additional health care costs. The private sector 
employees are covered by health insurance provided through Social Health Insurance Institutions 
(IPM) acting under oversight of the Ministry of Labour. Private sector retirees and some categories 
of public sector retirees have access to health care through the Old-age Pension Fund (IPRES). The 
self-employed in the formal sector can, voluntarily, access private social insurance related to health 
and work accidents. Workers in the informal or rural sector that are not eligible for any of the 
mandatory systems can voluntarily join a mutual health organization. As pointed out by the ILO 
assessment (ibid), there is no coverage for unemployment.  
There are several social assistance provisions, accessible to different vulnerable groups, mostly 
aimed at providing access to basic health care and offering in some instances family allowances. Four 
major instruments are (1) the Plan Sésame for seniors, running since 2006 and providing national free 
health care for people aged 60 years or more; (2) free health care initiatives for children under five; 
(3) free basic health care for students funded on the general budget and under oversight of the 
Ministry of Education. (4) the subsidies for caesarean sections, providing free caesareans since 2011 
in the entire country; and (5) subsidies targeting priority diseases, leading to i.e. free ARVs for HIV 
and anti-TB treatment in all public health facilities since 2004 (Tine et al., 2014).  
There has been quite some evolution in the Senegalese social protection context. In 2002 Senegal 
adopted a Strategic Document on Poverty Reduction 2003-2005 that did not at all take into account 
social protection. Three years later (2005), a first National Strategy on Social Protection 2005-2015 
was on the table, and twelve years later (2014), Senegal embedded social protection as spear point in 
its key policy document the ‘Emerging Senegal Plan’. A closer look at recent policy developments 
reveals that over the past decade several domains of social protection have been or are in flux. The 
pension system is one. Confronted with several problems, including a financial deficit for the 
National Pension Fund (FNR), low pensions in the IPRES scheme, failing governance and lacking 
supervision, the pension system has undergone some reforms in the beginning of the century (The 
World Bank, 2006). A more fundamental revision has been the topic of discussion at a national social 
conference on “The reform of the Senegal pensions, toward a viable and inclusive” [own translation] 
in June 2016. Another significant development has been the 2013 launch of a programme for family 
allowances or the ‘programme de Bourse de Securité Famiale’, inspired by the Bolsa Familia model. 
A pilot targeting 50.000 vulnerable families was launched in 2013 and an upscale to 200.000 families 
nation-wide has been the ambition. However, all consulted stakeholders confirm that health coverage 
is currently the issue at the top of the social protection agenda in Senegal, and more specifically the 
process toward the universal health coverage (CMU) that will include the informal sector. 
This process is guided by the Strategic Plan for the Development of Universal Health Coverage in 
Senegal, developed by the Ministry of Health and Social Action in 2013. The plan aims for a major 
reform in the health pillar of social protection with the introduction of universal health coverage. It 
is built around three axis: (1) improving access to free services (gratuités), (2) strengthening the 
mandatory health insurance for the private sector (via IPMs) and (3) building decentralized health 
insurance delivered through mutual health organization. The latter is referred to as the project for 
‘Extension of the health coverage through mutual health organisations in the context of 
decentralisation’9 or DECAM, equally the main focus of this case study. 
 
9  [Extension de la couverture du risque maladie à travers les mutuelles de santé dans le contexte de la Décentralisation]. 
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3.3 Mapping the move toward universal health coverage 
This section investigates the ongoing introduction of health coverage through mutual health 
organisations and brings together the available information on the technical and financial choices that 
are shaping DECAM, and on the underlying policy making and implementation process, including 
the role of different national and international actors.  
 Technical dimension 
With the recent reforms, Senegal is combining two regimes. On the one hand it is expanding its 
medical assistance by providing free health care to specific target groups. On the other hand it is 
reinforcing its health insurance, through the reform of the existing health insurance in the formal 
sector and the introduction of DECAM to build health insurance in the informal sector. Looking at 
DECAM, Senegal has opted for a voluntary, contributory but subsidized health insurance mechanism 
managed by community based mutual health organisations. 
Figure 3.1 shows the basic idea of the DECAM approach in relation to the other social protection 
mechanisms in health. On the left side, the different access point to health insurance in the formal 
sector are visualized: mandatory contributory mechanism managed by the IPM for the private sector, 
by the state for the public sector, and as part of the pension system accessed by retirees through 
IPRES. These mechanisms provide coverage for those households of which the head is or was 
employed in the formal sector. On the right side the figure shows the much larger portion of the 
population that is active in the informal sector and that - some private insurers and some professional 
and community-based mutual health organisations aside - remains uncover for health risks. Across 
formal and informal sector recently expanded health assistance provides free basic health coverage 
for specific target groups: students, older than 60, younger than 5 and some health conditions. 
DECAM has the ambition to provide a health insurance for the remaining population. It should thus 
be seen as a complement to the health insurance in the formal sector and to the provision of targeted 
free basic health care as a social service. The financial flows have also been visualized, with orange 
arrows representing the flow of public resources, green arrows representing the flow of employees’ 
contributions and yellow arrows representing the flow of employers’ contributions. 
DECAM builds a universal mechanism, in the sense that it aims to cover all residents of local 
communities that do not benefit from any mandatory health coverage. Although it is clearly designed 
for the informal sector, it does not explicitly exclude anyone. Members contribute half of the 
membership fee themselves, the other half is covered the government. Specific provisions exist for 
people belonging to vulnerable groups: their full fee is payed for by the government.  
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Figure 3.1 DECAM in Universal Health Coverage of Senegal 
 
* Caisse de Sécurité Sociale (CSS), Institutions de Prévoyance Maladie (IPM), Institutions de Prévoyance 
Retraite (IPRES), Agence de la Couverture de Maladia Universelle (ACMU), Délégation générale à la 
protection sociale et à la solidarité nationale (DGPSN), Technical unit (TU). 
Pivotal figure in the implementation of DECAM are the community-based mutual health 
organisations (MHO). There should be at least 610 or one for each local community. These MHOs 
will be responsible, i.a. for sensibilisation, member recruitment, collection of membership 
contributions, closing contracts with health care providers, reimbursement of beneficiaries’ health 
expenses at the level of health posts and health centres, and identification of vulnerable groups. The 
harmonization of the type of services provided by the different mutual health organisations happens 
through a Minimal Benefit Package (Paquet Minimum de Bénéfices, PMB) determined by the 
Ministry of Health. Clearly, a crucial challenge is the institutional architecture: how to organize the 
mutual health organisations and reinforce the interface between community-based mutual health 
organisations and the different public institutions? Another crucial challenges will be the 
establishment of the healthy MHOs. Experience and research have shown that building strong, 
community-based organisations takes time and is most often a difficult and gradual process with 
ownership often remaining an issue. In the current timeline of DECAM there is no room for slow 
and gradual. Abt Associates, an American-Senegalese consultancy with strong ties to USAID, is 
currently establishing MHOs one by one. The question is to what extent these MHO are actually 
viable and will be able to carry the significant responsibilities of channelling public resources. A union 
of MHOs at the department level is next in the DECAM structure. The 45 departmental unions will 
have as main roles the sensibilisation towards the local authorities, mediation between different 
MHOs, and reimbursement of beneficiaries’ health expenses at the region hospitals, contracts with 
hospitals and the provision of technical support to the MHO. In fact, although the department union 
will play a supportive role, this final task will be mostly executed by a separate Technical Unit (TU) 
of approximately four professionals who will assist MHOs in their administration and conduct 
monitoring and evaluation. Next up is the union of MHOs at the regional level. One key role for the 
14 regional unions is mediation between the different organisations at the regional level and 
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representation of the MHOs on the political scene. It also has to negotiate enabling conventions and 
provides technical assistance, through training, a data management system, experience sharing, etc. 
Finally, a national federation will unite all MHO structures.  
Two important points need to be taken into account to understand this set-up. Firstly, all these 
structures, except for the technical unit, will be staffed by volunteers, unless individual mutual health 
organisations decide to use part of their income to hire permanent staff. Secondly as has been pointed 
out in the strategic document, the DECAM policy is more than the installation of this structures. It 
should also forge a strong partnership between the government, the local authorities at municipal 
level and the mutual health organisations. In that sense it is the translation of the decentralization 
policy that Senegal opted for almost a decade ago. A more elaborate visualization of what the entire 
structure should look like, is offered in annex 2.  
On the governance side, two key organisations are in play. The General Delegation for Social 
Protection and National Solidarity (DGPSN) and the Agency for Universal Health Coverage 
(ACMU). Both structures are rather new and the delineation of their respective mandates did not go 
without tension. The DGPSN, established in 2013 as an autonomous structure linked to the 
president, is responsible for assisting in policy development on social protection and for the 
coordination between the different social protection mechanisms10. The DGPSN is governed 
through an orientation council and headed by a general delegate. Its orientation council is composed 
mostly of public servants, with only 2 out of 13 members ‘representatives of the Platform of Non-
state Actors’. It is unclear, including to civil society organisations interviewed, who these two 
representatives are. Originally, the DGPSN was meant to become the pivotal structure for 
coordination and management of social protection in Senegal, but quickly part of its competences 
were transferred to a new structure, the Agency for Universal Health Coverage. ACMU11 was 
established in 2015. It is an autonomous institution, with the Ministry of Health and Social Action as 
its technical line ministry and the ministry of finance is the financial line ministry. It took over the 
health component of social protection from the DGPSN. It has to manage the different social 
protection mechanisms in health, except for the mandatory health insurance in formal sector. Its 
main responsibilities are the promotion of mutual health organisations; the development and 
implementation of policies for the extension of health coverage to vulnerable groups; ensuring the 
financing of the universal health coverage; and developing a data collection and management system. 
ACMU is directed by a General Director, and a Supervising Committee. Of its nine members one is 
a representative of the mutual health organization, and no other clear representation of civil society 
is envisioned. The articulation between DGPSN and ACMU remains unclear.  
Members of the voluntary health insurance get access to health services in the public sector, 
although the mutual health organisations can close additional conventions with private cabinets and 
pharmacies to include them in their insurance. With their membership card, beneficiaries can access 
care (consultation as well as some medicines) by paying only the moderator ticket. They do have to 
respect the health care pyramid, addressing the health post or the health centre first before being 
referred to a regional or national hospital. The mutual health organization or its union will reimburse 
the health care provider. This presumes health service providers keep track of the services to insured 
 
10 The DGPSN has to coordinate and drive the different social protection instruments. This includes the universal health coverage, the 
programme for Family Security Grants, the Sesame Plan for elderly, the social protection measures for disabled and for vulnerable 
groups and the establishment of a national unique registry, as an instrument for coordinating and harmonising the targeting of the 
different mechanisms.  
11  ACMU was predeceased by CACMU, the Support Unit for Universal Health Coverage that developed and operationalized the 
DECAM policy. Its duties were the promotion of universal health insurance; the strengthening of intra- and inter-sectoral collaboration; 
the establishment of solidarity mechanisms for financing; the regulation of prices for the providers of sanitary services in both the 
public and the private sector; and the monitoring and evaluation of different health insurance systems. However, CACMU was 
understaffed, lacked resources and technical capacity. It was also embedded in the Ministry of Health, were it suffered. 
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patients, keeping patient data that will enable the mutual health organisations to reimburse correctly. 
This system also assumes that mutual health organisations keep track of the number of members and 
their status (belonging to a vulnerable group or not) and communicate this to the government, 
enabling the government to pay the membership fees. At the moment this practice of data collection 
and management is still an issue at all levels However, it is even more problematic in the case of the 
free medical care provided to vulnerable groups (les ‘gratuités’). Health service providers fail to 
register all freely provided services correctly and the government fails to reimburse fully and timely, 
putting especially the hospital in a very difficult position. They are prefinancing the free care promised 
by the government and running out of funds. This in turn affects the working conditions for the 
health staff, forces the providers to charge beneficiaries of free care, and means beneficiaries of the 
voluntary health insurance get access to a health system that is depleted, unequipped, understaffed 
and forced to charge anyway. In that sense, the decision to launch free care for specific groups while 
at the same time attempting to convince the population to join health insurance seems to have led 
the negative synergy. 
Departmental Health Insurance Unit: experimenting with a different approach 
Interestingly an alternative approach is being piloted simultaneously with the first phases of the 
implementation of DECAM, as part of the bilateral cooperation between Senegal and Belgium. This approach 
focuses on a mutual health structure on the department level instead of the community level and puts a 
Departmental Health Insurance Unit12 or UDAM central. The executive management of the UDAM is in the 
hands of a professional team, while the members still remain in charge of the overall direction through the 
executive board and the general assembly. Like in DECAM members pay a moderator ticket and the service 
providers are reimbursed by the UDAM. At the start, the package covered by the UDAM did not include 
services at the level of regional hospitals, the rationale being that health posts and health centres should 
become better equipped and able to offer basic surgical procedures as well. Since the supply side of health 
services is not yet sufficiently developed to provide this, the process of including such services in the package 
is ongoing. The UDAMs also work with a forfeit instead of a flexible reimbursement of health services. On the 
one hand this discourages health services providers to offer unnecessary services and improves the 
predictability of the overall costs. It is also a way to embed solidarity in the system with reimbursements for 
‘cheap’ patients compensating for the ‘expensive’ patients. Another instrument used to improve solidarity is 
the promotion of group membership. In the UDAM members are obligated to join with at least 5 family 
members, and villages are encouraged to join together. This formula is having increasing success with several 
villages adhering. 
Key arguments put forward by the Belgian Development Cooperation in favour of this approach are its 
feasibility, long term institutional and financial viability and better management. Establishing UDAMs in 
45 departments would be far more feasible than establishing at least 610 mutual health organisations at 
community level. Taking into account the challenging institutional sustainability of MHO run by volunteers, it is 
consider a more viable option in the long term. This also goes for the financial sustainability. Being at the 
department level, the UDAMs can cover a bigger constituencies and this means they could benefit from 
economies of scale. So far, average adherence rates for MHOs at community level are suck around 2% to 3% 
of the target population. The pilot UDAMs have succeeded in reaching 10%. A study financed by the Belgian 
Development Cooperation indicated an adherence rate of 20-25% would allow the structure to become fully 
self-sufficient. A professional team in charge is considered to provide more guarantees for competent 
management and continuity than volunteers, especially in view of the responsibility of the MHOs to also 
participate in the implementation of free health care for vulnerable groups and the program for Family 
Security Grants.  
Opponents argue that the UDAM structure has not proven its financial viability, since the professional staff is 
currently still funded by the Belgians. They also oppose the smaller role for the members in the management 
of the MHO, which they considered an infringement on citizenship and a loss of social control. Taking a step 
back, it is an interesting observation that both Belgium and the United States (BTC/CTB and USAID) are 
currently involved in projects that support the implementation of decentralized health insurance for the 
informal sector, but with different approaches. It raises two instant question. To what extent will the lessons 
learned in both experiment be taken into account? In this regard, the DECAM policy also shows some 
 
12  [Unité Départemental de Assurance Maladie]. 
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interesting adjustments that might be inspired by the UDAM approach. For example, the introduction of 
technical units at department level payed for by the ACMU to support professionalization of the management 
in MHOs, and the possible introduction of forfeit instead of flexible reimbursement. Secondly, how do both 
approaches score on ownership? Contrary to UDAM, DECAM is being perceived as a national policy 
initiatives, whereas UDAM so far still has a stronger development project image.  
 Financial dimension 
The mechanism of decentralized health insurance provides coverage through a subsidized 
contributory mechanism with the members paying 50% of their membership fee and the government 
contributing the remaining 50%. For vulnerable groups, the government will pay the full membership 
cost. Or, put differently, DECAM is financed through the contributions of the subscribers and tax 
incomes. 
The financial architecture directing public resources into the decentralized health coverage system 
is still in full development.13 It was reported that currently 50% of the reimbursements go to the 
regional unions and for 50% to the mutual health organisations. The adequacy of division is 
contested, with different observers fearing that the mutual health organisations will remain 
underfinanced. On the other hand, actual data on the actual services delivered at the different levels, 
and at what cost, do not yet exist. This lack of data collection and data management is hindering a 
facts-based reimbursement. 
Looking at the bigger picture, interviewees seem to agree that at the moment there is no clear plan 
on how DECAM will be financed in the long term. So far, the available budgets (currently located 
at the Ministry of Health) have been more than sufficient (in part due to lack of capacity to spend it) 
and the surpluses are transferred to the budget of the subsequent financial year. These budgets are 
currently fed by taxes (income taxes and indirect taxes) in the formal sector as well as by contributions 
by the technical and financial partners (Belgium, Japan, France, USA, World Bank, UNICEF).  
In the light of the desired increase in coverage, the expected population growth and the need to limit 
dependency of external/cooperation resources, a long term financial plan is necessary. According to 
stakeholders “the government is thinking about it”14 and is “in need of an action plan on how to 
think about financing”15. According to some, different studies are being conducted by different actors 
(the Ministry of Economy and Finance, with support of USAID and The World Bank; and the 
National Delegation on Social Protection (DGPSN). According to others, these studies and clear 
options are already available but “stuck at the political level”16.  
The Ministry of Economy and Finance summarized that the budget of the Health Ministry cannot, 
in the long term, sustain the universal health coverage. They point out different options to create the 
necessary budgetary space: (1) improving the fiscal capacity of the state; (2) achieving more economic 
growth; (3) create new streams of revenue, such as specific taxes for health coverage or by increasing 
the overall tax base, for example through taxes on real estate, tobacco, telephone calls, remittances. 
Civil society representatives voice strong concern regarding the financial sustainability, but are at the 
 
13  The establishment of a National Solidarity Fund (Fond National de Solidarité Santé or FNSS) as well solidarity funds at departemental 
level (Fonds Départemental de Solidarité Santé or FDSS) were planned. The former will feed the latter and will provide the state 
subsidies to 1) increase the benefit package of all beneficiaries; 2) cover the adherence of targeted vulnerable groups and 3) provide 
state garantuees to enhance partnerships between mutual health organisations and financial institutions. The state of play of these 
funds is unclear. 
14  Interview government official 4 in May 2016, Dakar, Senegal. 
15  Interview government official 3 in May 2016, Dakar, Senegal. 
16  Interview government official 2 in May 2016, Dakar, Senegal. 
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same time ill-informed about ongoing studies and possible options. They do plan to increase the 
government’s sense of urgency regarding this issue.  
 Socio-political factors 
The DECAM policy did not appear out of the blue. Table 3.2 offers a chronological overview of the 
different steps that proceeded the development of this policy. It shows two things in particular. First, 
the rise of social protection as a concept in the international and - with some delay - in the Senegalese 
development policy. Secondly, the interaction between the ongoing (and, according to some, 
stagnated) policy development process on the mutual health organisations and the development of a 
policy on universal health coverage in Senegal.  
Since the ‘60s-‘70s mandatory insurance mechanisms for health and old age exist in the formal sector. 
Additionally, professional as well as community based mutual health organisations have developed 
since the late ‘80s. They have been supported by donors (i.e. USAID, ILO, WHO, Belgian Mutual 
Health Organisations) and at times by the Senegalese government, but they never realized extensive 
coverage. Access to health services remained problematic for the majority of the population, despite 
different attempts by donors, civil society and at times the Ministry of Health to boost the 
development of mutual health organisations (e.g. biannual regional concertations as of 1999, 
development of a strategic plan in 2004).  
Meanwhile, over the past decade, social protection rose on the international development agenda and 
made its entry in the Senegalese development policy as well. In 2005 it drafted its Poverty Reduction 
Strategy 2006-2013 (DSRP II) explicitly mentioning the need to extend social protection and putting 
a strong emphasis on health. It also stresses the importance of developing mutual health organisation 
as part of health coverage, thus integrating the key message brought forward by the 2004 Strategic 
Plan on the Development of Mutual Health Organisations sponsored by the Ministry of Health and 
donors. Also in 2005 a National Strategy on Social Protection was developed, aimed at reinforcing 
existing instruments of social protection, including disaster prevention and social protection for 
vulnerable groups (Banque Africaine de Développement & Fonds Africain de Développement, 2010, 
p. 15). Again the development of mutual health organisations was included.  
In 2006, former president Wade introduced Plan Sésame, providing free health care for the aged 
above 60. Its reason for existence was never questioned, but the programme suffered financial 
difficulties and did not take off. Overall health coverage remained problematic. By 2012 mandatory 
health insurance systems only reached a coverage of 11% of the population, according to the 
Senegalese government (Mbengue, 2016). Voluntary systems, through community-based mutual 
health organisations or private insurers did not succeed in boosting coverage significantly. Even all 
mechanisms combined covered less than 20% of the population. A 2013 assessment estimated that 
of the 20% covered, the mechanism targeting public servants represented 40%, the mechanism for 
the private sector (IPM) 24%, the voluntary system based on mutual health organisations 27% and 
private insurers 8%. Especially population in the rural and informal sector were left without coverage 
(Republique du Senegal, 2014).  
During his election campaign, president Sall made health coverage a spear point with his promise the 
extend coverage from 20% in 2012 to 75% in 2017. After his election in 2012 health coverage shot 
to the top of the political agenda. With such an ambitious presidential deadline swift policy making 
was demanded. National concertation were held in 2013, including social partners, the mutual health 
organisations and the financial and technical partners, to discuss the different options for improving 
coverage. In 2013, the Senegalese government concluded that “the system for health coverage is no 
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longer in line with the aspirations and demographic demands and the eradication of poverty in 
contemporary Senegal” (Ministère de la Santé et de l’Action Sociale, 2013) [own translation]. It 
launched a strategic plan for the development of universal health coverage in Senegal. It used the 
previously defined National Strategy in Economic and Social Development as a starting point, in 
which social protection is pursued through “the extentions of social protection in the informal sector 
and to vulnerable groups by the implementation of a basic universal health coverage through mutual 
health organisations” (Ministère de la Santé et de l’Action Sociale, 2013, p. 19) [own translation]. It 
added that the key challenge would be to create a synergy between the efforts by the government, the 
municipalities and the community-based dynamics. To this effect « the hard core of the DECAM 
strategy is to implement an effective partnership between the mutual health organisations, the 
municipalities and the state” (Ministère de la Santé et de l’Action Sociale, 2013, p. 19) [own 
translation].  
Table 3.2 Chronological overview of policy developments leading to DECAM 
Policy developments on 
universal health coverage mutual health organisations 
1975 Mandatory social and health insurance extended to all formal sector workers  
 Emergence of mutual health organisations as an associative movement in Senegal. End ‘80s 
 Start of active promotion of a decentralized health mutualism by the Senegalese government. 
After two waves of support for the development of MHO, the issue will fall off the political 
agenda, although different international partners will continue support. 
1994 
 Law on the decentralisation of the administrative and health system adopted. Decentralization 
becomes a key element in the reform of public political structures. 
1996 
2001 Social protection became a preferred instrument of the Millennium Development Goals and 
the World Bank promoted social protection as a key component of international poverty 
reduction strategies. In 2001, the International Labour Organisation launched major campaign 
to promote the extension of social security coverage.  
 
 
2002 The 2002 International Labour Conference (ILC) Resolution on Decent Work and the 
Informal Economy marked a tripartite consensus on informality and included social protection 
as one of four pillars for decent work in the informal sector. 
 
 The Strategic Plan for the Development of Mutual Health Organisations in Senegal17 was 
developed. The process was driven by the Ministry of Health but with strong involvement of 
MHOs, the ILO, USAID, consultancies GRAIM, EPOS and Abt Associates, and the Belgian 
Christian Mutual Health organization 
2004 
2005 The World Health Assembly Resolution 58.33 on Sustainable health financing, universal 
coverage and social health insurance was adopted. 
 
2005 First National Strategy on Social Protection18 adopted, covering the period 2005-2015.   
2006 Strategic Document for Poverty Reduction 2006-201019 (DSRP II) was developed, revising 
and updating the first DSRP. DSRP II was based on 4 spear points of which the third was 
dedicated to social protection, the prevention and management of risks and disasters.  
 
2008 National strategy for the extension of coverage for health risks of the Senegalese population20 
was developed by the Support Unit for the Financing of Health and Partnerships (CAFSP) and 
sponsored by the American (USAID) and French development cooperation (AfD). It 
proposed the establishment of a National Fund for Health Solidarity21 and a pilot for 
2008 
 
 
17  [Plan Stratégique de Développement des Mutuelles de Santé au Sénégal]. 
18  [Stratégie nationale de protection sociale]. 
19  [Document de Stratégie de Réduction de la Pauvreté pour la période 2006-2010]. 
20  [Stratégie nationale d’extension de la couverture du risque maladie des Sénégalais]. 
21  [Fonds National de Solidarité Santé]. 
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decentralisation and extention of health coverage22 (DECAM) in Diourbel, Kaolack, Kolda, 
Louga et Saint-Louis. 
2009 A National Plan for Health Development23 (PNDS 2009-2018) was developed that, amongst 
other issues addressed the health coverage for vulnerable groups and that referred to the 
National Strategy for the extension of coverage (above) to address this. 
 
 A national workshop on the sustainability of mutual health organisations in Senegal24 was 
organised by the Ministry of Health and USAID. 
2011 
2012 A new government headed by president Macky Sall came to power in Senegal. His main 
campaign promise was to extend health coverage from 20% of the population in 2013 to 75% 
in 2017. 
 
The ILO adoped its Social Protection Floors Recommendation (No. 202)   
The Senegalese Ministry of Health, Public Hygiene and Prevention (MSHPP) was reformed 
into the Ministry of Health and Social Action (MSAS). Mack Sall also appoints a new Minister 
at the head of MSAS, Mrs. Awa Marie Colle SECK. 
 
 
 
 
The Support Unit for Universal Health Coverage (CACMU) is established to replace the 
CAFSP. Connected to MSAS cabinet, the cel is charged with the development of a system that 
offers financial access to health care for all. 
 
2013 The MSAS developed a Strategic Plan for the Development of the Universal Health Coverage 
in Senegal, covering the period 2013-2017. Central to its approach is the creation of one 
mutual health organisation in each local community. 
2013 
2013 The General Delegation on Social Protection and National Solidarity25 (DGPSN) is 
established, connected to the cabinet of the president. The DGPSN is charged with the 
management of national solidarity for the poor and the Family Security Grants26 (BSF). 
 
2015 The Agency for Universal Health Coverage (ACMU) is established  
The Ministry of Health and Social Action reported that policy discussion on the extension of health 
insurance started in 2007 and engaged different parties involved in the organisation, implementation 
and financing of health and social protection, including administrations, social partners, civil society, 
donors and mutual health organisations. The results of these debates have been integrated in the 
National Plan for Health Development (PNDS 2009-2018) and again in the Stratégie Nationale de 
Développement Economique et Social (SNDES 2013-2017) (Ministère de la Santé et de l’Action 
Sociale, 2013, p. 7). However, this does not entirely do justice to the reflections regarding 
decentralization and the development of mutual health organisations that had been ongoing 
since the mid-’90s. A mapping of the different policy documents throughout the process as well 
interviews with stakeholders indicate that the proponents of the community based mutual health 
system succeeded in gradually embedding mutualism in Senegal’s social protection policy. In fact, 
because of the policy formulation efforts they had been doing over the course of the past decade, 
they had concrete propositions ready when a political window of opportunity opened up and were 
thus able to make mutual health organisations the pivot of the DECAM policy. 
Also important has been the role of various international donors. It is beyond the scope of this 
study to reconstruct all development cooperation relevant to social protection and offer an exhaustive 
discussion, but some features stand out. Firstly, there has been the role of international organisations 
in pushing social protection on the agenda. The World Bank, the ILO, the WHO, the UN and the 
AU have clearly contributed to the agenda setting of social protection, and specifically health 
 
22  (Décentralisation et Extension de la Couverture de l’Assurance Maladie - DECAM). 
23  Plan National de Développement Sanitaire. 
24  [Atelier de contribution à la pérennisation des mutuelles de santé au Sénégal]. 
25  [Délégation générale à la protection sociale et à la solidarité nationale]. 
26  Bourse de Sécurité Familiale (BSF). 
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coverage. Their influence is visible through the many references in the various policy documents, for 
example with regard to the WHO resolution approved at its assembly in 2005 on fair access to health 
services, the UN resolution on universal coverage adopted in 2012, the efforts of the Economic and 
Monetary Union of West Africa to support the development of mutual health organisations. As one 
stakeholder pointed out: “By 2012-2013 universal health coverage was really ‘hot’ in Africa. It was in 
all the big debates at the United Nations, the African Union, and so on. There was a clear paradigm 
shift”27 [own translation].  
Secondly, there is the interesting role of international and bilateral donors in gradually embedding 
mutualism in the current health coverage approach. In particular USAID seems to have played a 
significant role, as it has been supporting the development of mutual health organisations and of 
policy on the issue since the ‘90s. For example, the current DECAM policy refers to the National 
Plan for Health Development (PNDS) that in its turn is based on the National Strategy for the 
Extension of Coverage for Health Risks developed with assistance of USAID and AfD.  
Finally, the role of specific individuals should be taken into account in this interaction between 
development cooperation and national policy. For example, François Diopp, a renowned specialist 
in and strong proponent of mutual health organisations, has been participating in the policy 
discussion and formulation since it started in the ‘90s. He previously worked for USAID and his 
consultancy Abt Associates is currently a key implementing partner of DECAM. Abt Associates co-
authored with USAID and AfD the previously discussed National Strategy for the Extension of 
Coverage for Health Risks. The current general director of the Agency for Universal Health 
Coverage, Mr Cheikh Seydi Aboubeker Mbengue, previously worked for USAID. Although it is 
difficult to assess to what extent the national DECAM policy is in fact USAID inspired, it is quite 
clear that key resources persons and officials involved in DECAM have (or had) a strong relationship 
with USAID. Interestingly an alternative approach to DECAM is being piloted simultaneously, as 
part of the bilateral cooperation between Senegal and Belgium. This approach focuses on the 
department level instead of the community level and puts the Departmental Health Insurance Unit28 
or UDAM central. This means both Belgium and the United States (BTC/CTB and USAID) are 
currently involved in pilot projects experimenting with different approaches for the coordination and 
capacity reinforcement of the mutual health organisations that will play a lead role in the new universal 
health system. Interviewees clearly indicate that the concertation and exchange between them not 
going smoothly. 
Even more difficult is reconstructing the role that different national actors have played. Interviewees 
could not identify any experts on the matter of CMU in the parliament or the respective political 
parties. The civil society seems divided. On the one hand mutual health organisations clearly 
participated and shaped the policy discussion. On the other hand other trade unions seems to have 
invested little effort, and other civil society organisations indicate they were not ready to provide 
input or they were ignored. These are important dynamics to understand the final policy choice. For 
example, the option of reforming the entire health coverage system, formal sector mechanisms 
included, would have meant negotiations with well-established structures in which employers and 
trade unions are strongly represented. Stakeholders indicate that these parties did not favour a 
revision of the existing structures, and the outlook of protracted negotiations was not considered 
favourable in the light of the presidential countdown to 2017. For easier than reviewing existing 
structures, was to limit the exercise to the sector were hardly anything existed: the informal sector. A 
similar dynamic may have happened in the rural sector where CNCR29, the umbrella organization 
 
27  Interview government official 2 in May 2016, Dakar, Senegal. 
28  [Unité Départemental de Assurance Maladie]. 
29  Conseil National de Concertation t de Coopération des Ruraux (CNCR). 
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representing almost thirty agricultural federations and unions, reportedly was piloting a health 
insurance for farmers in cooperation with the government. However, this initiative was not taken 
into account and even undermined by the new DECAM policy. Recently, CONGAD30, the national 
platform representing 178 CSOs, embarked on a decentralized consultation of its constituency on 
the issue of health coverage and handed over its input for improving the current reform toward 
universal health coverage to the Health Ministry in June 201631.  
3.4 Analysis of redistributive potential  
As was pointed out by Fonteneau and Van Ongevalle (2014), the potential for redistribution of wealth 
of a mechanism will be determined by the different technical, financial and socio-political factors. 
Applying this to the DECAM approach as described above (see recap), leads to the following remarks 
regarding the potential for redistribution. 
The choice for a universal health insurance system is a good foundation for redistribution. However, 
in this case the mechanism is specifically designed for the informal sector, meaning the heterogeneity 
of the insured beneficiaries will be low. The mechanism will mostly cover rural, informal workers 
confronted with the same precarious working conditions and livelihood risks. Poor and vulnerable 
groups can adhere to the same mechanism, but at the expense of the state. This is a more 
redistributive choice compared to developing a safety net only providing services to the poor. 
However, it also means the government has opted to include the poor and vulnerable in the same 
mechanism, thus further increasing the risks the mechanism is exposed to. Option that would have 
increased the potential for redistribution between different socio-economic population groups, would 
have been to fuse mechanisms covering the formal and informal workers, or to include the poor and 
vulnerable groups in the health insurance covering the formal sector workers, at the expense of the 
state. A mandatory insurance would have increase redistribution potential as well. Instead group-
based membership to the voluntary mechanism has been envisioned but this is not enforced in 
practice. This means selective membership (only adhering those that face most health risks) remains 
a challenge, further increasing the homogeneity of the membership base and thus limiting the 
potential for redistribution. 
DECAM will be financed through a combination of budget reallocation, increased (indirect) tax 
revenue and improving tax collection capacity, extending membership contributions and use of aid 
and transfer. The available information did not allow to determine the relative importance of each of 
these financing sources. However, in general terms it can be said that the use of tax income to 
subsidize the health insurance of the informal sector definitely is a strong redistributive element. The 
significant involvement of different international development partners, although problematic from 
a sustainability perspective, is also a sign of international redistribution.  
Investigating the socio-political dimension, two different aspects come up. On the one hand the 
interplay within and between the different institutional actors charged with the implementation, 
management and governance of a social protection mechanism. In the case of DECAM, its success 
will depend on establishing the partnership between the central government agency, the local 
authorities and the mutual health organisations. Additionally, the interplay between DECAM and 
other social protection mechanisms (BSF, gratuités) may also affect the potential for redistribution 
of all the mechanisms.  
 
30  CONSEIL DES ORGANISATIONS NON GOUVERNEMENTALES D’APPUI AU DEVELOPPEMENT. 
31  Interview civil society representative, May 2016, Dakar. 
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On the other hand there are the politics that have shaped and continue to shape the policy 
formulation and implementation of DECAM. From the case study it is clear that these political 
dynamics are crucial to understand the different choices made. Political factors that have clearly 
played a role include: (1) the rise of social protection on the international development agenda and 
the emphasis on universal health coverage in key institutions such as the WHO; (2) the long track 
record of donor involvement in the development of mutual health organisations, which contributed 
to the development of a network (an epistemic community) of professional and community-based 
mutual health organisations, expert resource persons, favourably-disposed policy makers and 
financial and technical partners in support of the idea of mutualism; (3) the presidential promise to 
boost coverage, creating momentum as well as high time pressure to move ahead; (4) the fact that 
previously formulated policy documents featuring the development of mutual health organisations 
were available at the time policy formulation accelerated; (5) the trade unions that did not lobby for 
the inclusion of the informal sector but instead opted to protect the health insurance in the formal 
sector from absorbing additional risks and from changes in governance possible weakening union 
position; (6) the civil society that did not have a strong track record on social protection and possibly 
lacked capacity and legitimacy to really influence the policy formulation; (7) the importance of the 
principle of decentralization embedded in Senegalese public policy; (8) the absence of redistribution 
as a guiding idea in the entire policy process.  
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4 |  Case study 2: Morocco 
Population: 33.3 Million (2015) 
Area: 446,550 sq km (excluding Western Sahara) 
Languages: Arab, Berber, French 
Religion: Muslim (99%), other (1%) 
Life expectance: 76.7 (2015) 
Dependency ratio32: 50.1% (2015) 
Unemployed: 9.2% of labour force (2013) 
Corruption Perception Index Ranking: 90/176 (2016) 
(Transparency International 2016; (CIA, 2015; The World Bank, 2015) 
4.1  Political and economic country profile 
The scene for recent development in the field of social protection is partially set by political factors. 
Morocco is an ex-protectorate of France. After independence in 1956, Sultan Mohammed became 
king. He was succeeded in 1961 by his son, Hassan II, who ruled for 38 years. King Hassan II played 
an important role in the search for peace in the Middle East but also brutally oppressed domestic 
opposition. Mohammed VI, his son and successor as of 1999, introduced some economic and social 
liberalisation.  
In response to the pro-democracy ‘Arab Spring’ protests in 2011, King Mohammed VI launched a 
reform program that included a new constitution, passed by popular referendum in July 2011. The 
new constitution grants more powers to the prime minister and parliament, but the king still retains 
veto power over most government decisions and he and his court (the Makhzen) maintains a firm 
grip on executive power. Since the reform, the Moroccan constitution also explicitly refers (in 
article 31) to the right to social protection, health coverage and mutual solidarity, and it stipulates the 
ambition of the government and the public institutions to mobilise all available means to facilitate an 
equal access to this rights.  
The moderate Islamist Justice and Development Party (PJD) became the biggest party in the 
parliamentary elections of November 2011. In line with the new constitution, the king appointed PJD 
leader Abdelilah Benkirane’s as prime minister. The PJD has filled most key government posts but 
rules by coalition government. Its original main coalition partner, the Istiqlal party, withdrew in 2013 
after a dispute over cuts and other issues. A new coalition was formed with centre-right National 
Rally of Independents (RNI), which is close to the King, and led to the replacement of 19 ministers 
on key posts. The new coalition weakened the ruling Islamists who are trying to introduce unpopular 
reforms to subsidies on fuel and food and the pensions system.  
General elections in October 2016 resulted in a resounding victory for the PJD gaining a total of 
125 seats in parliament. However, its main opponent, the royalist Authenticity and Modernity Party 
(PAM) also doubled its number of seats from 55 to 102. With whom PJD will form a government 
 
32  The number of individuals that are likely to be economically “dependent” on the support of others. 
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remained to be seen at the moment of writing, as both PJD and PAM had ruled out a cooperation. 
Issues that featured in the electoral programmes of most political parties were the bad state of the 
educational system, the high youth unemployment, the pension reform, and improvement of health 
services and coverage. However, the public debate in the run-up to the elections seemed mostly 
dominated by PJD-PAM rivalry: “The rivalry (…) overshadows important yet unaddressed structural 
social and economic issues that have long plagued the country” (Fabiano, 2016).  
Morocco does have a rather stable economy. Key economic sectors include agriculture, tourism, 
aerospace, phosphates, textiles, and apparel (CIA, 2015). The past decades were marked by steady 
growth. Although poor harvests and the economic crisis of 2008 did cause an economic slowdown, 
growth has been averaging 4.3% per year between 2010 and 2013 (The World Bank, 2015, p. 2). 2015 
was a strong year but latest estimates indicate a deceleration of the growth in 2016, mostly due to a 
contraction in agricultural production. It is expected that 2017 will partly redress this trend. The 
emergence of new growth drivers in higher value-added industries such as manufacturing and 
aeronautics is a promising trend (The World Bank, 2016).  
Key challenges today remain the high unemployment, rising prices of basic commodities, poverty, 
inequality, and illiteracy, particularly in rural areas. Extreme poverty has nearly been eradicated and 
relative poverty and vulnerability declined significantly. Still, 20% of the population lives in poverty 
or under threat of falling into poverty. Morocco’s Gini coefficient, a key indicator for inequality, 
stands at 0.41, one of the highest in the MENA region, and the country also lags behind when it 
comes to health and education, especially in the rural areas. Unemployment remained at 9-10% since 
2009 and participation rates, especially among youth and women, are declining33 (The World Bank, 
2015).  
From an overall development and social protection perspective, some interesting policy 
developments are taking place. The government is implementing several investment programs 
aimed at improving the business environment, such as the National Emerging Industries Agreement 
(PNEI), Plan Maroc Vert for the agriculture sector and the Halieutis Strategy for the fishing sector. 
In 2015 it adopted the ‘Vision 2015-2030’, a new strategy to guide major reforms in the education 
system. The same year, a new national Employment Strategy was developed. Since 2014 an Integrated 
National Youth Strategy (with measures for economic, social and political inclusion) has been on the 
table (The World Bank, 2015), since 2013 a National Strategy for the promotion of Micro-enterprises 
(providing incentives for formalisation) is being implemented.  
4.2 Snapshot of social protection landscape 
The 2014-2015 World Social Protection Report (ILO, 2014) summarized the state of social security 
around the world. The ILO assessed Moroccan legislation on social protection as ‘semi-
comprehensive’. Amongst the different social protection domains - sickness, maternity, old age, 
employment injury, invalidity, survivors, family allowances, and unemployment - all areas were 
covered by at least one programme anchored in national legislation, except for the risk of 
unemployment. Assessing legal frameworks as well as coverage, governance, benefits and targeting, 
the ILO and the World Bank seem to agree on the state of the Moroccan social protection system: it 
is fragmented, favours the wealthiest households, is limited in scope, and coverage and is poorly 
targeted (ILO, 2008; The World Bank, 2015).  
 
33  So, while unemployment rates may be declining. 
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Table 4.1 Overview of social protection coverage in Morocco 
* Caisse nationale de Sécurité sociale (CNSS); Caisse nationale des Organismes de Prévoyance sociale 
(CNOPS); L’Agence Nationale de l’Assurance Maladie (ANAM); Régime Collectif d’Allocation de Retraite 
(RCAR); Caisse Interprofessionnel de Retraite Marocaine (CIRM). 
Source CLEISS, 2015a; ISSA, 2010; The World Bank, 2015 
In broad strokes34, the Moroccan social protection system features four major social insurance 
mechanisms implemented at a national level and mostly targeting the private and public sector 
workers: the Caisse Nationale de Sécurité Sociale (CNSS) providing mandatory social insurance to 
employees in the private sector; the Caisse Nationale des Organismes de Prévoyance Sociale 
(CNOPS) managing the mandatory medical insurance (AMO) for the employees in the public sector; 
 
34  For a full overview of the different social protection provisions in place in Morocco, a combination of different sources can be 
consulted, including the ILO Social Security Inquiry (with data dating from 2013), the ILO’s World Social Protection report from 
2014/2015 and two strategic notes by the World Bank on social protection (2002) and on targeting and social protection (2011). 
Target group Formal 
sector: 
civil servants  
Formal 
sector: 
salary 
workers  
Formal 
sector: 
self-
employed 
Informal 
sector 
Vulnerable 
groups 
Area of risk 
Birth Mandatory 
insurance 
(CNOPS) 
Mandatory 
insurance 
(CNSS) 
No No Medical 
assistance 
through 
RAMED 
(CNSS) 
Family 
allowances 
Yes Yes No No Conditional 
cash transfers 
trough Tayssir 
(Ministry of 
Education). 
Possibly some 
other non-
contributory 
safety net 
programs 
Work (injuries, 
illness, disability, 
& death) 
Mandatory 
employer-
liability 
(private 
insurer)  
Mandatory 
employer-
liability 
(private 
insurer) 
No No No 
Work 
(unemployment) 
 Mandatory 
insurance 
(IPE) 
No No No 
Health Mandatory 
insurance 
(CNOPS) 
Mandatory 
insurance 
(CNSS) 
Voluntary 
insurance 
(Inaya): never 
implemented 
Voluntary 
insurance 
(MHO): 
marginal 
Medical 
assistance 
through 
RAMED 
(CNSS) 
Old age Mandatory 
insurance 
(RCAR & 
CMR) 
Mandatory 
insurance 
(CNSS); 
voluntary 
additional 
insurance 
(CIRM) 
No ? ? 
Natural Disasters ? 
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the Régime Collectif d’Allocation de Retraite (RCAR) administering the pensions of local state 
employees and temporary workers in the public sector; and the Caisse Marocaine de Retraite (CMR) 
which administers a number of non-contributory pension schemes for, among others, old resistance 
fighters, civil and military invalidity pensions. This is complemented the Caisse Interprofessionnel de 
Retraite Marocaine (CIRM), an initiative of employers, that provides complementary pensions for 
private sector employees. Additionally, there are several mutual societies and private schemes, but 
their coverage is marginal (The World Bank, 2015, p. 16).  
Additional instruments offering social assistance to the poor and vulnerable groups also exist. The 
government invested in education support (program TAYSSIR with conditional cash transfers), 
health assistance (through RAMED), social assistance to specific groups (e.g. programs for disabled 
individuals, and social protection centres) and social funds to stimulate local infrastructure investment 
and income generating activities. The government also launched a National Initiative for Human 
Development (INHD) that is comprised of several programs providing safety nets, such as Program 
to Fight Poverty in Rural Areas, Program to Fight Social Exclusion in Urban Areas. It was beyond 
the scope of this study to trace, across these different programs and measures, what is being covered 
by which program for who. A more detailed description of the social assistance programs can be 
found in annex 3. 
Despite the variety of safety-nets, the last available data of 2009 showed that public expenditure was 
dominated by butane and food subsidies expenditure: on total public spending, the subsidies took 
68.2% of the budget, while non-subsidy safety nets represented 3.1% (The World Bank, 2015, p. 24). 
As in many countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Morocco favoured consumer 
price subsidies on food and fuel for a long time. These subsidies (for example on liquid fuel, butane, 
bread, sugar) were designed to safeguard poor households from price fluctuations, but turn out be 
very expensive while favouring in fact the wealthiest households (that consume the most) (Devereux, 
2015; The World Bank, 2012, 2015). Morocco is now in the process of reforming its subsidy system. 
In 2014 it announced the end of subsidies of gasoline and fuel oil and had started to cut significantly 
diesel subsidies as part of its drive to repair public finances. But the government, keen to avoid the 
kind of social unrest, said it would continue to subsidise wheat, sugar and cooking gas used by poorer 
Moroccans.  
Recent and ongoing reforms are - slowly - changing the face of social protection in Morocco, 
especially with regard to unemployment, pensions and health. In view of the high mobility on 
Moroccan labour market, steps are being made to cover the major risk of unemployment. In 2000, 
social dialogue led to an agreement on the establishment of an unemployment insurance scheme 
(Indemnité pour perte de l’emploi, IPE) for private sector workers affiliated with CNSS. After years 
of studies and debate (between workers’ representatives, employers’ representatives and the 
government) the IPE was finally launched in 2014. 
With regard to pensions, technical reforms scattered across the different providers have been taking 
place between 2002 and 2006: the main providers CMR, CIMR, RCAR implemented changes, such 
as an increase of the contributions, an indexation of the pensions and an adjustment pension age. 
However, these changes were of a technical nature, adjusting specific modalities within existing 
regimes and by no means a fundamental adjustment of the pension system. Given the fragmented 
nature of the pension system that is suffering from structural problems, a social dialogue on the need 
for a reform has been ongoing since 2007, a systemic review of the pension system was announced 
in 2010. One of the issues raised, is the bad financial health of the current systems and the 
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questionable long term viability35. The by the government announced changes triggered mass 
demonstration in Casablanca on 29 November 2016 and a national strike on 10 December 2016 was 
organised by a coalition of the four major union confederations. They jointly denounce “the absence 
of a fair social policy and social dialogue on the part of the government which takes unilateral 
decisions that threaten the social stability of the country and who called on the government to 
establish a participatory approach in reforming the pension system (Arbaoui, 2015). In the meantime, 
the Moroccan government has requested capacity support at the ILO (ILO, 2012).  
Last but not least, important efforts to increase the coverage of social protection related to health for 
salary workers, independent workers and the poor are ongoing. This has been launched by the 
adoption of Law 65.00 in 2002 on Basic Medical Coverage. The law has resulted in the 
introduction of a mandatory health insurance36 (AMO) for the formal sector and the establishment 
of a medical assistance scheme for the economically destitute37 (RAMED38). The expansion of the 
latter to the national level and the expansion of former to other target groups (e.g. independent 
workers and students) are still work in progress. According to interviewees, this is the most significant 
reform in social protection at the moment. The move towards basic medical coverage for all, and 
specifically the introduction of RAMED, has been selected as the focus of this case study.  
4.3 Expanding health coverage though different routes  
This section investigates the ongoing introduction of health coverage through mutual health 
organisations and brings together the available information on the technical and financial choices that 
are shaping DECAM, and on the underlying policy making and implementation process, including 
the role of different national and international actors.  
 Technical dimension 
In essence, the 2002 Law on Basic Medical Coverage embodies a choice for two different regimes. 
On the one hand a contributory mandatory health insurance is envisioned to cover (1) all active 
workers and retirees in the formal public and private sector as well as their families, (2) all self-
employed or independent workers, (3) veterans and (4) students. On the other hand a contributory 
medical assistance scheme is to provide access to health services for all indigents that are not covered 
by the health insurance. This medical assistance is contributory and state-subsidized. Figure 4.1 gives 
on overview of the different regimes, target groups, mechanisms and resource flows. 
Within these two regimes, a further breakdown into specific target groups, each served by a separate 
mechanism, is being implemented. In fact, the overall population can be divided in three major 
groups, representing roughly a third of the population each: ‘salary workers’, ‘self-employed or 
independent workers’ and ‘the poor’. Each of these groups is subdivided: (1) salary workers either 
belong to the public sector or the private sector; (2) independent workers can be divided according 
to socio-professional category, which roughly means between organised professions (formal sector) 
and the informal sector; (3) the poor are divided into two groups, either poor/vulnerable or extreme 
poor/indigent, depending on their level of income. An additional group cutting across is that of the 
 
35  Although the Moroccan population is currently young, the demographic deterioration is expected to be rapid. Even more 
problematic is that the system demographics, especially of the public pension systems even worse off are: the aging process if the 
pension schemes is faster than the ageing process of the total population, and both threaten the long term viability of the systems 
(The World Bank, 2015, p. 17). 
36  Assurance Maladie Obligatoire. 
37  Régime d’assistance médicale. 
38  Régime d’Assistance Médicale aux Economiquement Démunis. 
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students. For each of these different groups different mechanisms for health coverage have been or 
are being implemented.  
The mandatory health insurance (AMO) for salary workers in public and private sector is managed 
by two different institutions, respectively the CNOPS and the CNSS. CNOPS and CNSS were 
established as mutual health organisations decades ago but are now transitioning to public institutions 
managing the mandatory health insurance. For the workers in the public sector, the current reforms 
do not change much. For CNOPS itself however they do pose a sustainability challenge. CNOPS is 
currently absorbing a lot of retirees in its population, as well as students (between 40.000 and 50.000) 
and this is putting pressure on the financial viability. Workers in the public sector often also have 
complementary health insurance through mutual health organisations or private insurance 
companies. Clear progress has been made for salary workers in the private sector falling under the 
AMO managed by CNSS: although employers still register their employees and their performed hours 
incompletely, coverage in the private sector has expanded. When all coverage issues are resolved, 
AMO should cover about 3 million public and private workers directly, and about 7 million people 
when including dependents.  
Besides the health insurance for the salary workers in the private sector, CNSS has recently been 
mandated to manage the health insurance for the independent workers (AMI) still in the making. 
This will happen through the establishment of a separate fund, but details on how to fee collection, 
rates, service package and the government’s role are not available yet. A law on the issue has been 
adopted in August 2016 (Law 98-15). Reportedly, the insurance envisioned by this law would be 
mandatory and would cover over 11 million people or 30% percent of Morocco’s population. 
Interviewees nuance that the actual implementation will be gradual, starting with the organized 
professions (Anon, 2016). This operationalization of AMI for different sub-sectors will require 
further implementing, and it remains unclear how the financial sustainability can be ensured and if, 
when and how the unorganized informal sector will be included (Interviews public servant, 2016). 
Moroccan residents that cannot access AMO and whose annual income is equal to or lower than 
5.650 dirhams (approx. 525 euro) per family member, have access to the medical assistance scheme 
RAMED. RAMED is seen as a way to ensure everyone’s constitutional right to access to health. 
RAMED further distinguishes between poor, who do have to contribute, and the extreme poor, who 
are currently exempted. RAMED uses a rather sophisticated methodology for targeting that 
combines proxy means testing and community targeting methods39. However, a 2012 evaluation 
indicated the use of outdated data and very high errors of exclusion, with 72% of the actual target 
population excluded from the program. Another point of critique was that applicants need to register 
in person at designated facilities which may exclude families in remote areas, and that few efforts are 
being done to guard the quality of the data collection and data management (e.g. no digital data input 
at the local level, processing of paper applications takes long, local officials not trained to accompany 
applicants to provide correct data). There are some communal mutual health organisations active in 
the informal sector but their coverage is almost negligible. In 2008 it was estimated that nine million 
people, nearly a third of the population, would be covered by the RAMED system (ILO, 2008, 
p. 34-35). However, at the time of writing there was no systematic outreach and the system relied on 
self-registration, which may limit the accessibility for underprivileged households with limited access 
to information. Since RAMED’s start over 10 million people have had access at some point in time, 
and end 2016 the number of active cards stood at 6.345.525 (ANAM, 2016, p. 48). 
 
39  Based on the data collected through the application form, a household receive a particular score that needs to be bellow certain 
predetermined thresholds to qualify. Additionally inter-ministerial local committees decide on eligibility, as a mechanisms to reduce 
exclusion errors (The World Bank, 2015, p. 30). 
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Overall, the social protection in health leaves two coverage gaps. Firstly, those belonging to the 
unorganized informal sector and not fitting the RAMED criteria are not covered by any system and 
no clear initiatives are ready to address this. Secondly, incomplete registration by private sector 
employers of their employees has led to a coverage gap in the formal private sector. According to the 
Moroccan administration, the currently active systems combined achieve a coverage of approximately 
60% of the total Moroccan population, whereas in 2005 this was still only 25% (ANAM, 2016, p. 46). 
Belonging to one or the other regime has far reaching consequences for the services one can access. 
Those covered by AMO can have access to the health care services in the public or private sector, at 
any level in the health care cascade and anywhere in the country. They will be reimbursed by their 
insurance. However, there is a difference between the packages offered by CNOPS and CNSS. 
CNOPS has a far more complete package. CNSS has been gradually expanding its package since 2010 
but the convergence of both systems remains a challenge today. Those who are not covered by AMO 
can only access medical assistance if they have a valid RAMED card. With a card, they can only access 
health services in the public sector, only in the region where the card has been issues and only at the 
lowest level of the health care cascade unless they have a referral. RAMED does not provide 
reimbursements but offers free health care. In theory, those covered by RAMED have access to a 
very complete health care package but under the condition that the listed services are available. In 
practice many services are not available in the public health system, due to the basic health 
infrastructure and lack of human resources, in which case a Ramedist has no other option but to turn 
to the private sector and pay out of pocket. Several civil society representatives and public servants 
alike confirmed that the gap between demand and supply in the Moroccan health sector, and the 
uneven geographical distribution of health providers means the equal access to the right to medical 
care often remain empty words. 
Current reforms will also affect the possibility of CNOPS and CNSS to establish and manage health 
care facilities themselves. Both organisations have done so in the past (for example a pharmacy in the 
case of CNOPS and policlinics in the case of CNSS) but a new law being drafted could make this 
impossible. This would address the possible conflict of interest that can arise when managing the 
insurance while also managing service provision but would also curtail one of the ways to address the 
gaps in the health care supply.  
Looking at the governance side, the picture becomes even more complex. Lead players are the 
Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Finance, ANAM and the King. ANAM, a government agency 
with financial autonomy, is the regulating body of AMO. Legally, it is also charged with the financial 
management of RAMED. However, in contradiction to the law, the implementing order does not 
recognized the financial management role of ANAM. At least until September 2016 the Ministry of 
Health was keeping the management in own hands, and had not forwarded any budgets to ANAM. 
The financial management aside, the law did not arrange for a regulatory body for RAMED. Meaning 
that there is no official regulator for RAMED, and the establishment of such structure is currently 
on the political agenda. 
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Figure 4.1 Mechanisms providing basic medical coverage in Morocco 
 
* Mutual Health Organisation (MHO); l’Agence Nationale de l’Assurance Maladie (ANAM), Assurance de 
Maladie pour les Indépendents (AMI); Fond de Cohesion Sociale (FCS), Ministère de la Santé (MS); Régime 
d’Assistance Médicale aux Economiquement Démunis (RAMED); Caisse Nationale des Organismes de 
Prévoyance Sociale (CNOPS); Caisse Nationale de Sécurité Sociale (CNSS). 
Important decisions on the guiding principles, the main mechanisms, the governance structure have 
been made. The discussion is no longer about what general approach would be most suited and 
viable. Instead, there are some acute challenges on a rather technical level. For example, the transition 
period for CNOPS and CNSS has come to an end, and different changes should come into effect. 
As mutual health organisations, both organisations invested in their own health service providers, 
such as a pharmacy or a polyclinic. Transitioning into public institutions, they will no longer be 
allowed to combine the roles of provider and manager, and will have to sell off their own health care 
structures. Other challenges are the development of treatment protocols with the health sector, and 
the enforcement of previously made price agreements by ANAM. The development of a data 
collection and management system is also high on the agenda.  
But the biggest challenge of all is the gradual expansion and harmonisation and convergence of the 
different systems, the ultimate goal of the Moroccan approach. The reform is cumulative, as it builds 
on what existed and progressively expands scope. Many interviewees agree that in a first phase it does 
cause fragmentation. However, interviewees and policy documents all explicitly point out that the 
progressive harmonisation of the different systems will enable a convergence into a unified system. 
An exact timeline does not exist, but different interviewees speculate it will take at least two terms to 
arrive at this stage. 
 Financial dimension 
The financing of the AMO, the mandatory health insurance is partially based on a solidarity 
contribution by employers of 1.5% of the total of salaries payed. Additionally employer and employee 
each contribute 2% of the salary. Pensioners contribute 4% of their pension. Students in public 
education are exempted from contributing and have free access. Students in private education pay a 
forfeit. CNOPS and CNSS use the same employer-employee contributions, but in the public sector 
contributions are held at the source (ANAM, 2014). These arrangements are currently sufficient to 
“keep things going”, as one interviewee put it. In fact, in 2013, both CNOPS’s and CNSS’s income 
exceeded its costs. However, the long term viability of both funds, and especially of CNOPS, is facing 
challenges. One of them is the financing of costs related to chronic diseases, and of the expansion of 
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the coverage. The financial health of the AMO over the next 10 years has been the subject of an 
actuary study in 2016 (ANAM, 2016).  
An interesting aspect in the financial architecture, is the distribution of reimbursements to the private 
and public health care providers. Only between 6% and 10% of the reimbursements by CNOPS and 
CNSS go to the health care facilities in the public sector. This while 71% of the CNOPS’ incomes 
are coming from the government in its role as employer.40 This means there is a transfer of public 
resources to the private health care providers. ANAM has launched a campaign to boost the image 
of the public health care sector, but so far this has not been successful.  
The government, the local communities and the beneficiaries themselves combine efforts to finance 
RAMED. Financing studies anticipated that the state would contribute 75%, local communities 6% 
and the beneficiaries 19%. However, these estimates were based on the assumption that the 
population covered by RAMED would be 55% extreme poor and 54% poor, whereas in reality the 
ratio currently is 87% versus 13%. Hence, far less ‘Ramedistes’ can currently contribute to the system, 
meaning less income is generated. At the same time the cost is also higher than expected, because of 
the increase in demand of medical care with 200% since the introduction of RAMED (Semlali, 2016).  
Complications related to governance also hinder the financing. Legally ANAM is in charge of the 
financial management of RAMED, but the Ministry of Health has currently assumed this role. 
However, at the moment of writing there is no separate budget line for RAMED. Instead health 
service providers get financing either directly from the health budget or through the Fund for Social 
Cohesion41. This is however overall funding and not a direct response to costs being made for the 
care provided to ‘Ramedistes’. In fact, at the time of data collection, interviewees confirmed that it is 
not known how much RAMED is actually costing, and they strongly doubted whether the financing 
by the state is, in each of the health care facilities, in proportion to the costs made in response to 
RAMED.  
In the meantime ANAM, without a budget to manage, remains side-lined when comes to RAMED. 
In response to this anomaly many local communities are refusing to contribute. The contributions of 
the beneficiaries are being collected in a fund, but this money too is stuck due to the stand-off 
between ANAM and the Ministry of Health. The Ministry of Economy and Finance also plays a role 
in the problematic financial situation of RAMED, because in absence of predictability of costs and a 
clear source of incomes for RAMED it has prevented a budget line from being opened.  
Looking at the overall picture, interviewees assert that the current costs of the health system are not 
in proportion to the health budget. The current budget cannot suffice to finance the generalization 
of RAMED and decrease the out-of-pocket share of the households in health cost. Interviewees with 
a long track record in public service also seem to agree that the financial sustainability of the current 
approach is relative. Since there is political and social support, the systems will continue to exist. It is 
considered near to impossible for the state to come back on its decision to provide medical assistance. 
This means that to guarantee the continuation, a balance is pursued between the coverage and quality 
of the services and the overall cost.  
 
40  Interview with CNOPS official, Rabat, September 2016. 
41  Fond de Cohésion Sociale. 
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  Socio-political factors 
Interviewees agree that the policy process on CMB started at the end of the ‘80s. Table 4.1 provides 
a timeline of key events. Following the structural adjustment plan, the situation in the health sector 
around 1989 was dire. Some social protection mechanisms in health (mostly mutual health 
organisations) existed since independence, but they were limited to the formal sector, facultative, and 
dependent on the goodwill of employers and employees. Overall coverage was very low and the 
services covered were minimal. Those left uncovered were mostly people in precarious situations. 
Although in theory they had access to free medical care, public hospitals did not receive sufficient 
government funding to provide this care, and no legislation existed to force them. The havoc in the 
infrastructure, education, and health sector triggered waves of social unrest and bread riots in the ‘80s 
and early ‘90s.  
In 1990 the Moroccan government responded with a first major reform in the health sector: medical 
assistance for the poor and medical insurance for the formal sector workers were introduced. These 
provisions have been gradually expanded and build on by subsequent governments, but the coverage 
of the facultative insurance mechanisms only reached 17% and the medical assistance based on a 
‘poverty card’ was notorious for its malfunctioning.  
In 1998 the first opposition government, headed by the socialist Abderrahmane Youssoufi, was 
elected in 30 years. During its period in office, the Youssoufi government (1997-2002) managed to 
build a consensus on phasing in universal health coverage for the Moroccan population. This led to 
the adoption of the Law 65.00 on basic medical coverage in 2002, which triggered the current 
reform process. The law contained the introduction of both AMO and RAMED.  
Only after the law entered into force in 2005 the first real steps for its implementation were made. 
As of 2005 the different actors started to put things into motion, but “everybody was playing in his 
own corner”. In 2008, a 6-month pilot for RAMED was introduced in three provinces. It would take 
until 2012 before the generalisation of RAMED is announced.  
Stakeholders all agree that the process has recently undergone a clear acceleration. According to some, 
this has been triggered by the Arab Spring of 2011, putting pressure on the government and resulting 
in a revised constitution that recognizes social protection as a right to all. Other stakeholders point 
to the establishment of an interministerial committee42 on the reform of basic medical coverage in 
2013. It held its first meeting in December 2014 and has reportedly been key in clarifying key political 
choices, formulating a shared strategy and increasing the visibility of this reform. The committee is 
composed of public servants and no civil society representatives take part, but whenever necessary 
experts are invited to provide input. 
For both AMO and RAMED it can be said that the policy process went through a first cycle of 
agenda setting, goal setting, policy formulation and implementation, with the first policy effects now 
becoming visible and feeding a new policy cycle. Having gone through different stages of expansion 
and generalisation, both RAMED and AMO face important challenges to maintain their 
sustainability. For example, even combined, RAMED and AMO cover only 60% of the population 
today. How to reach the remaining 40% is an important question. Also, after three years generalized 
RAMED, Minister of Health, El Houssaine Louardi, recognized the need to evaluate: “we have been 
asked to rethink our vision and methodology in order to confront the current realities of targeting, 
care, financing and governance of the regime” (quoted in L’Economist, 16/03/2015) [own 
translation].  
 
42  Comité Interministériel de pilotage de la réforme du régime de la couverture médicale de base. 
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Table 4.2 Timeline reforms in health sector 
Policy developments 
National International 
 Financial institutions IMF and World Bank push for structural adjustment plans including in 
Morocco 
‘70s ‘80s 
1989-
1990 
Start of reflections on health coverage after structural adjustment plans had caused social 
havoc. In response, facultative health insurance for the formal sector and medical assistance 
for the poor are introduced. 
 
1998-
2002 
First socialist government, under prime minister Youssoufi, builds a consensus on phasing in 
universal medical coverage for the Moroccan population.  
 
 UN, the World Bank, and the ILO all include social protection in their development policy. 2000-2002 
2002 Law on Basic Medical Coverage 65.00 was adopted, introducing 1) mandatory health insurance 
for the formal sector (AMO) and 2) a non-contributory health assistance scheme for poor and 
vulnerable families (RAMED) 
 
 The World Health Assembly Resolution 58.33 on sustainable health financing, universal 
coverage and social health insurance was adopted 
2005 
2005 Social partners signed a charter in support of Basic Medical Coverage  
Law 65.00 enters into force. Establishment of the National Agency on Health Insurance 
(ANAM) 
 
Official introduction of AMO, leading to an expansion of health coverage from 17% in 2005 
to 34% in 2007 
 
 First phase of the Parcoum43 programme on medical coverage reform financed i.e. by EU and 
AfDB.  
2006-2008 
2008 RAMED pilot is launched in two regions. It is planned to run for 6 months but stagnates.   
2011 Arab Spring 2011 
2011 Revision of the constitution with inclusion of social protection as a right  
2012 Following the evaluation of the RAMED pilot, its generalization was announced by the King.  
2013 Establishment of an inter-ministerial committee uniting all government departments and 
structures involved in basic medical coverage. With support of the EU.  
 
New director at ANAM develops strategy and improves coordination   
2014 A road map 2014-2018 is developed, setting-out the gradual development of the universal 
health coverage. It is also the start of the publication of annual reports by ANAM 
 
2016 Students included in AMO.  
Law on Mandatory Health Insurance for Independent workers (AMI) adopted.  
Policy discussion and study on a possible regulating body for RAMED ongoing.  
From this reconstruction of the socio-political process that led to the adoption of Law 65.00 on 
universal basic health coverage, the following reading of how national actors joined forces emerged: 
The public pressure during the ‘90s and the arrival of a socialist government in 1998 created a window 
of opportunity for universal health coverage to rise on the political agenda. Over the next years, a 
group of national experts, worked on drafting a consensus proposal. Within it, a group of public 
servants, many from the Health Ministry, lobbied for the inclusion of both AMO and RAMED. They 
believed that if RAMED did not make this bill, it would be near to impossible to get it back on the 
agenda afterwards.  
 
43  The EU-financed Medical Coverage Reform Support Programme, currently in its third phase, see below. 
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They had to work with the limited data available and did many concessions (e.g. not establishing an 
new expensive regulating body), but succeeded in including RAMED, in part thanks to the support 
of King Mohammed VI and the trade unions. The unions insisted on a reflection about the system 
in its totality (“une reflection globale”). Although their interests and say weighed far more heavily in 
the discussion on mechanisms targeting the formal sector, their principal support for a discussion 
about covering both the formal and informal sector kept RAMED on the agenda. King Mohammed 
VI, in line with his reputation as ‘King of the Poor’, strongly supported RAMED. Different 
stakeholders assert that his support unblocked discussions and forced the government to create some 
financial space for RAMED. The fact that he, in person, launched the generalisation of RAMED is 
also seen as an explanation for the momentum that has been created since. 
Against this coalition of forces in favour of a broad social protection in health, other actors played a 
more restraining role. The Ministry of Economy and Finance in particular complicated policy 
formulation and implementation on RAMED due to legitimate concerns about the financial 
predictability. To date, it remains unclear how much RAMED costs, due to gaps in data collection 
and data management. Also, the service package covered by RAMED has been defined in a way44 
that complicates long term cost-assessment. The packages covers a very broad range of health 
services, including for example all preventive care, dental care, and orthodontics for children, and 
excluding only plastic surgery explicitly. The condition is that the services are provided at public 
health care facilities (Law 65.00, Titre II, Art. 121). Consequently, the more investments are made in 
the public health sector and the more services become available, the more RAMED will cost. The 
historic health care demand proved to be a bad indicator, as has been shown by a rise in demand with 
200% since 2012.  
That this is not a simple story of good guys versus bad guys, becomes even clearer when also looking 
at AMO. Targeting the formal sector, the trade unions played a key role in the policy formulation on 
AMO. They were instrumental in creating the policy space for the reform but also insisted on the 
preservation and reinforcement of the existing structures under their control: CNOPS and CNSS. 
Hence, several interviewees link the cumulative nature of this reform and the following fragmentation 
at least in part to the lobby of the unions. The reforms in the health sector are at the top of the 
political agenda, especially during the run up to the elections of October 2016. Although it is not a 
topic of a broad public debate, political parties and trade unions are very active and vocal on the 
issue. For the unions, public service provision in education and health are currently top priority, and 
they will not support parties that think otherwise.  
Except for the unions and some profession-based organisations (e.g. representing the pharmacists, 
the doctors), no indications of significant participation of other civil society organisations was found. 
CSOs indicate this may be due to the fact that few CSOs have specialised on the topic of social 
protection in health, because very little funding is available to do so. They also link social protection 
to (decent) work and hence to a domain that has been claimed by the unions. In fact, almost all 
reports of concertation with non-state actors in this policy process refer to the unions. In view of the 
low degree of union membership, CSOs do not feel this is the right course of action.  
This interplay between different national actors led to a cumulative reform that aimed to gradually 
expand coverage through the establishment of different parallel mechanisms, thus also contributing 
to fragmentation. One assessment, dating 2008, came to a harsh verdict on the merits of this process: 
“When the reform of health funding in Morocco was implemented through the AMO and the 
 
44  WHO considers this to be a ‘negative’ definition of the service package: it states people have a right to all services and notes some 
exceptions. WHO prefers a ‘positive’ definition that describes in detailed what can be offered and that can be expanded when 
financial possibilities expand. 
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RAMED, the power struggle between these different vectors of influence impeded the delivery of 
the expected product. The initial project, prepared by a group of national experts, ultimately emerged 
so diluted as to be ineffectual. Health insurance coverage rose from 17% in 2004 to nearly 35% in 
2007, but there were many observable flaws in its functioning.” (Zine-Eddine El-Idrissi et al. 2008). 
Although clear flaws in the functioning clearly still exist, recent events make it difficult to maintain 
this judgement: meanwhile the generalisation of RAMED did go through, manifest difficulties in 
coordination have been addressed to some extend since the arrival of a new ANAM-director and the 
establishment of an inter-ministerial committee, and the goal of gradual expansion is still being 
pursued in practice with some recent advances (students, law on AMI). Despite these recent 
developments it is still true - and confirmed by several interviewees - that the basic idea of the basic 
medical coverage was  
The role of international actors should also be taken into account. Key international actors in the 
domain of health are the EU, the World Bank, the ADB, the European Investment Bank, the Global 
Fund and the French Development Agency. In particular the World Bank, the ADB, and the 
European Union have supported the move to universal health coverage through their participation 
in the Support Programme for the Reform of Basic Health Coverage (PARCOUM), ongoing (in 
different phases) since 2002. WHO is providing technical support. However, all interviewees agree 
that the direct influence of international on actual policy choices was very limited. This aligns with 
the observation that external funding in fact represents only a very small portion of the health budget 
in Morocco (around 1.1%) (WHO 2016). 
4.4 Analysis of redistributive potential 
As was pointed out by Fonteneau and Van Ongevalle (2014), the potential for redistribution of wealth 
of a mechanism will be determined by the different technical, financial and socio-political factors. 
Applying this to the move toward Basic Health Coverage (CMB) in Morocco as described above (see 
recap), leads to the following remarks regarding the potential for redistribution. 
A first striking observation is the fragmentation in the Moroccan system. Different mechanisms serve 
different target groups. The long term goal may be gradual harmonisation and convergence, leading 
to a unified system, but very few attempts to transcend the different silos and to establish 
redistribution between the different socio-economic population groups have been observed in this 
study. The health assistance (RAMED) is partially financed by the state budget and can hence be 
considered tax-funded to some extent. But in the light of the clearly insufficient funding (leading to 
strong pressure on the public health care providers) and the ongoing discussions on the introduction 
of a moderating ticket in RAMED, this seems a very half-hearted attempt at redistribution. This 
resonated with how key officials formulate the government’s priorities: “Let’s begin with solidarity 
between the sick and the healthy. Maybe afterward we can work on solidarity between the rich and 
the poor”.  
That solidarity between the sick and the healthy is indeed being increased to some extent through the 
current reforms, because the heterogeneity of the different target groups is increasing. This is a logic 
result of making the insurance mandatory. For the health insurance in the public sector it is also the 
consequence of including the retirees and the students in its population.  
Looking at redistribution that promotes equal rights, another observation comes up. The medical 
assistance scheme for the economically destitute (RAMED) was established to counteract the unequal 
access to health care: in 2008 more than half of the Moroccan hospital budget benefitted the 30% 
richest whereas less than 8% was spent on the 30% poorest (ILO, 2008, p. 34). RAMED has indeed 
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increased access to health services for the poor, as the spectacular rise in demand can show. However, 
the choices made by the Moroccan government have also consolidated a dichotomy between 
different population groups, giving some groups more rights and choices, while limiting the rights 
and choices of others. Beneficiaries of the mandatory health insurance can access private and public 
sector, whereas the ‘Ramedistes’ can only access the public sector. This is especially problematic 
because the supply of health services is geographically badly distributed, leaving some areas with 
hardly any services and concentrating the services in major cities. Additionally, because of the bad 
image of the public sector the flow of resources in the health insurance is in fact reinforcing the gap 
between private and public health care providers. This difference in services one can access reflects 
a certain idea on the respective roles of the state and the individual. As one high ranking official chose 
to phrase it: “We believe it is normal that whoever is credit worthy gets access to the best system and 
the most options. Whoever is payed for by the state, will have to settle with what is offered”. 
Different institutional hitches have also affected redistributive potential. Firstly, the fragmentation 
and the lack of coordination have impeded a smooth implementation of the reform especially during 
its first decade. The law was adopted in 2002 and come into force in 2005 but until the establishment 
of an interministerial committee in 2013, the different components active in the reform worked 
parallel. Secondly, the reconstruction shows that RAMED is, institutionally, not well-imbedded. It 
does not have a predictable and reliable funding source, it does not have a regulator, the managing 
role of ANAM is being undermined and the implementation of RAMED on the ground has mostly 
just been added to the work load of local public servants. 
A part from these technical and financial factors, politics clearly have shaped and continue to shape 
the policy formulation and implementation of CMB reform. Political factors that have clearly played 
a role include: (1) social unrest and public pressure preceded different accelerations in the reform 
process (during the ‘90s; and in 2011 with the Arab Spring); (2) change makers within the 
administration played in important role in building political consensus on a system for basic medical 
coverage, and in keeping RAMED on the political agenda; (3) the support of the King and the trade 
unions was key to expand the scope of the policy discussion and also include coverage of the poor 
and the informal sector; (4) the existence of strong institutions (mutual health organisations) backed 
by the trade unions was an important argument in favour of a cumulative reform that would gradually 
expand coverage and evolve toward a unified system in the long term; (5) aside from trade unions, 
civil society organisations have played a very limited role. This can be explained because they lacked 
(and still lack) expertise on the topic, but also because they were not actively consulted or included 
in the policy formulation process. 
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APPENDIX 1 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK  
appendix 1 Analytical framework 
Building on the tri-dimensional analysis of redistributive protection put forward in the first research 
paper (Fonteneau & Van Ongevalle, 2015) and using insightful research by Hikey (2008), Hikey and 
Paver (2015), we developed an analytic framework that unpacks how the tri-dimensional analysis can 
be applied to a specific social protection system in a country. This analytic framework offered 
guidance for the data collection as well as for the in-case and cross-case analysis and reporting. 
The framework is built around 6 key components:  
1. Political and economic country profile = a concise but up to date overview of the current 
political and economic landscape.  
This section includes information on: (1) the current political settlement; (2) recent shifts in 
power and the window of opportunity this may have created for agenda setting on new policies; 
(3) the place of the different actors involved in social protection within the larger political and 
economic system; (4) the economic context in which different options for financing social 
protection need to be considered; (5) major policies that determine the broader context. 
2. Snapshot of social protection landscape = mapping the different components of the existing 
social protection landscape, and identifying the components that are the subject of recent or 
ongoing policy reforms.  
Social protection can address risks in a variety of domains. Following the Social Security 
(Minimum Standards) ILO Convention, 1952 (No. 102)45, this framework considers birth, death, 
work (unemployment and work-related injuries and illness), health, old age and natural disasters 
as key domains of risk. The snapshot maps the existing mechanisms that aim to address risks in 
these domains, and discusses who has access to these different branches of social protection. In 
ongoing national policy processes not all of these domains are necessarily addressed and some 
may receive far more attention than others. Because our interest is in the redistributive power of 
social protection, the focus be on a domain characterize by important reforms towards universal 
protection. Based on the snapshot, one domain will be selected for further investigation in the 
case study.  
3. Reconstruction of the policy cycle = a more in-depth analysis of the recent policy 
developments in the selected domain of social protection. 
This will entail (1) a reconstruction of the timeline of recent policy events; (2) a discussion of the 
different stages of the policy cycle: problem formulation, agenda and goal setting, 
instrumentation, implementation (see above); (3) a discourse analysis that summarizes the explicit 
policy goals and hints about the underlying policy theory and paradigm; (4) a discussion of 
 
45  This convention lays down the minimum standard for the level of social security benefits and the conditions under which they are 
granted. 
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elements that can explain the course of the policy process (such as patch dependency, the 
involvement of different actors including donors or international organisations).  
It is likely that several measures or mechanisms exist or are being implemented in a specific 
domain of social protection. The study will focus on the mechanism that aspires the most 
universal coverage.  
4. Analysis of the technical dimension = discussion of the technical features of the mechanism(s) 
through which social protection in the selected domain is/will be implemented.  
Social protection can be delivered through four main mechanisms. The first is social insurance 
(contributory schemes), the second is social assistance (tax based), the third covers employment 
protection and promotion (both in a passive and an active way) and the fourth covers social 
services (also see above). This section will investigate: (1) the mechanism(s) deployed; (2) the 
intended target group; (3) the key implementing actors; (4) management and coordination. 
Institutions that deliver social protection can be divided between the state (government agencies) 
and non-state actors, where non-state actors include the market (e.g. private insurance), the family 
(e.g. remittances), religious institutions (e.g. mosques and churches), as well as international 
agencies (e.g. the WFP), international NGOs (e.g. Save the Children) and local NGOs (Devereux, 
2015, p. 37). 
5. Analysis of the financial dimension = discussion of the funding options being considered or 
implemented in the concerned mechanism(s). 
Several studies have demonstrated the affordability of basic social protection packages in a range 
of low- and middle-income countries (ILO, 2008, Fonteneau, 2014). The 2014 World Social 
Protection Report (ILO, 2014) identified eight different options to create the necessary fiscal 
space for financing social protection. These are (1) reallocation of current public revenues; 
(2) increasing tax revenues; (3) extending social security contributions; (4) borrowing or 
restructuring existing debt; (5) Curtailing illicit financial flows; (6) drawing on increasing aid and 
transfers; (7) using fiscal and central bank foreign exchange reserves; (8) adopting a more 
accommodating macroeconomic framework. 
This component will investigate (1) which financial options have been considered and/or 
selected in the mechanism(s) and the reforms discussed, (2) how participatory and in-depth this 
debate has been, (3) what the prospects are for sustainable financing and (4) the potential for 
redistribution at the national level. 
6. In-depth actor map per domain = overview and discussion of all actors involved in the process 
of policy development and implementation.  
This should provide insight in the role of IOs, donors, international NGOs, national CSOs, 
ministries, other official institutions, political parties, parliament, elites, etc. Aspects to consider 
include: the history of the actor, its key interest and agenda, its relative power, its key ideas on 
social protection, the influence of external actors on its views regarding social protection, its 
role in the policy process. The actor map will be informed and will inform the reconstruction 
of the policy cycle (component 3). 
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The framework has been used in the first round of data collection, as guide for identifying and 
structuring relevant data available in policy documents and literature. The result of this first round, 
was represented in a first concept note. This exercise allowed to pinpoint questions, patterns, and 
knowledge gaps that need to be addressed based on the field research. After insights from the field 
had been added to complete this picture, a final screening of literature was done to cross-check any 
findings with previous research. To round up, key findings and more general insights for supporting 
the redistributive potential of social protection have been put forward. 
A key resource in determining our research approach, has been de policy cycle, schematically 
summarized in figure a1.1 below. This representation of the policy cycle distinguishes between four 
key phases in a policy process (Crabbé et al., 2006; De Peuter et al., 2007):  
- agenda setting and goal setting: certain issues make it onto the political agenda, a problem 
formulation describes the undesired situation and implicitly set goals for the desired situation; 
- policy development, including policy formulation and instrumentation: different solutions are being 
identified, considered and selected, a process that can vary in openness with different degrees of 
participation for societal actors like media, interest groups, citizens and civil servants. The policy 
choices are political and determined by the power balance between the actors involved; 
- policy implementation: operationalisation in policy measures, instruments, division of tasks, 
allocation of resources and mandates, the formulation of rules and procedures, and the 
establishment of mechanisms for management and coordination. Implementing actors can exert a 
strong influence on how the policy is executed; 
- policy effects: implementation of policy will result in policy output (acts performed by executive 
actors, such as for example the number of pensions distributed), in policy outcomes for the target 
group (such as a decrease in salary workers above 60 years old living in poverty) and in policy 
impact at the broader level (such as a formalization of economy). These policy effects and side 
effects together with external events determine needs and problems in society and are the beginning 
of a new policy cycle.  
Figure a1.1 Schematic representation of a policy cycle 
 
* The highlighted policy phases include problem formulation and agenda setting, goal setting and policy 
formulation, and the implementation. 
Source Crabbé et al., 2006 
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appendix 2 Politics in social protection 
Figure a2.1 Conceptual framework: politics in social protection 
 
Source Lavers & Hickey, 2016 p. 395 
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appendix 3 Social protection in Senegal 
Quite some other programs providing social safety nets have been identified in a 2013 World Bank 
assessment.  
- Food Security Commissariat (Commissariat à la Securité Alimentaire - CSA) provides food aid 
assistance to vulnerable populations either in response to catastrophes or through rice distribution 
at public rallies and religious festivals; 
- National Solidarity Fund (Fonds de Solidarité Nationale – FSN) is responsible for providing 
immediate responses to crisis and emergency situations, including financial, medical and material 
support;  
- Community-Based Re-adaptation Program (Programme de réadaptation à base communautaire 
PRBC) provides social, economic and cultural integration for disabled persons via material support 
and funding of income generation activities; vulnerable elderly (over 60 years) via capacity 
strengthening, grants and subsidized loans for income generating activities to groups of elderly; 
- National School Lunch Program (Programme d’alimentation scolaire - DCaS) provides school 
lunches funded through the national budget; 
- WFP School Lunch Program (PAM Cantines Scolaires) supports the national school lunch program 
by providing hot meals in pre-schools and primary schools located in rural and peri-urban 
vulnerable areas;  
- Educational Support for Vulnerable Children (Bourses d’étude pour les orphelins et autres enfants 
vulnérables – OEV) a program through the National HIV-AIDS Council to provide for schooling 
or professional training to children orphaned or affected by HIV-AIDS and other vulnerable 
children;  
- Poverty Reduction Program (Programme d’appui à la mise en oeuvre de la Stratégie de Réduction 
de la Pauvreté – PRP) supports grants for income generating activities for vulnerable groups, 
primarily women, the disabled and HIV-AIDS affected populations;  
- a pilot Cash Transfers for Child Nutrition Program (Nutrition ciblée sur l’enfant et transferts 
sociaux-NETS) entailing cash grants to mothers of vulnerable children under 5 years old to mitigate 
the negative impacts of food price increases; 
- WFP Vouchers for Food Pilot Program (Bons d’Achat – PAM CV) to address food insecurity 
among vulnerable households due to rising food prices; 
- The Social Protection Initiative for Vulnerable Children (Initiative de protection sociale des enfants 
vulnérables – IPSEV) Cash grants to households to help them maintain vulnerable children and 
ensure access to health and education services (World Bank, 2013). 
Table a3.1 below summarizes the main social protection provisions in place.  
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Table a3.1 Overview of existing provisions (anno 2015) for different social protection components in 
Senegal 
Risk area Target groups Covered by Managing 
institution 
Services 
include 
Coverage 
Birth Formal sector Mandatory 
insurance based 
on contributions 
by employer 
Caisse de 
Sécurité Sociale 
(CSS) 
Prenatal 
allowance, 
maternity 
allowance, 
family allowance, 
compensation 
 
 Everyone Medical 
assistance 
Centres de 
Protection 
Maternelle et 
Infantile (PMI) 
Prenatal 
consultations, 
vaccination new 
borns, post-natal 
follow-up  
 
 Everyone Medical 
assistance 
Centres de Santé 
à Soins 
Obstétricaux 
d’Urgence and 
hospitals 
Free caesareans  
      
Health Salary workers in 
the private sector 
+ family 
Mandatory 
insurance based 
on employees’ 
and employers’ 
contributions 
Institution de 
Coordination de 
l’Assurance 
Maladie 
Obligatoire 
(ICAMO) 
Institutions de 
Prévoyance 
Maladie (IPM) 
Refund of 40% 
to 80% of for 
health care  
700.000 
 Civil servants + 
family 
Mandatory 
regime financed 
through fixed 
budget item 
Ministry of 
Finance 
 300.000 
 Self-employed in 
the formal sector 
Voluntary health 
insurance based 
on contributions 
Private mutual 
health 
organisations 
  
 Retirees (from 
formal sector) + 
family 
Pension based 
on contributions 
Institutions de 
Prévoyance 
Retraite (IPRES) 
Free health care 
in IPRES 
structure 
 
 Vulnerable 
groups (+60, -5, 
pregnant 
women, poor) 
Medical 
assistance 
Plan Sésame & 
other programs 
Free health care  
 Workers in 
informal sector 
health insurance 
based on partial 
or complete 
subsidized 
contributions 
Caisse autonome 
de Prévoyance 
Social 
Universelle 
(DGPSN, 
CAPSU) 
Minimum 
package health 
care 
still under 
development 
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Work 
Accidents 
& sickness 
Salary workers in 
the formal sector 
Obligatory 
insurance based 
on contributions 
by employer 
   
 Self-employed in 
the formal sector 
Voluntary 
insurance 
Caisse de 
Sécurité Sociale 
(CSS) 
  
      
Old age Civil servants Obligatory 
insurance based 
on employees’ 
and employers’ 
contributions 
National 
Retirement Fund 
(FNR) 
 35.000 
 Salary workers in 
the private sector 
(and specific 
types of civil 
servants) 
 Private Sector 
pension Scheme 
(IPRES) 
 200.000 
* Highlighted provisions have been introduced after 2010. 
Source CLEISS, 2015b; Ministère de la Santé et de l’Action Sociale, 2013 
Figure a3.1 Overview of the DECAM structure 
 
Source Ministère de la Santé et de l’Action Sociale, 2013, p. 22 
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appendix 4 Social protection in Morocco 
Table a4.1 Overview of existing provisions (anno 2015) for different social protection components in 
Morocco 
Old age Salary workers in 
public service 
Obligatory 
insurance based 
on contributions 
by employer 
Régime Collectif 
d’Allocation de 
Retraite (RCAR) 
Basic pensions 200.000 
 Civil servants, 
old resistance 
fighters, old civil 
and military 
personnel  
Non-
contributory, 
social assistance 
Caisse Marocaine 
de Retraite 
(CMR) 
Basic pensions 
and invalidity 
pensions 
700.000 
 Salary workers in 
private sector 
Obligatory 
insurance based 
on contributions 
by employer 
Caisse nationale 
de Sécurité 
sociale (CNSS) 
Basic pensions 2.000.000 
 Salary workers in 
private sector  
Voluntary social 
insurance 
organized by 
employer  
Caisse 
Interprofessionn
el de Retraite 
Marocaine 
(CIRM) 
Pensions, 
invalidity 
pensions, 
survivors 
benefits 
 
   Private insurance 
companies 
  
      
Family Parents with 
children between 
8 and 15, in rural 
areas with 
poverty rate + 
30% and school 
desertion rate + 
5% 
TAYSSIR Social Affairs 
Directorate at 
Ministry of 
Education 
Conditional cash 
transfers to 
improve 
participation in 
primary school 
812.000 
      
Additional 
safety net 
programs 
Individuals with 
disabilities 
Program for 
Disabled 
Individuals 
Social 
Development 
Agency and 
Entraide of 
Ministry of 
Social 
Development 
Support to 
initiatives that 
support the 
target group + 
management of 
polyvalent 
centres. 
10.989 
 Individuals in 
vulnerable 
situations 
Social Protection 
Centres 
Social 
Development 
Agency (ADS) 
and Entraide of 
Ministry of 
Social 
Development 
? 160.000 
 Girls and women 
in difficult socio-
economic 
conditions 
Centres for 
Training & 
Education 
Ministry of 
Social 
Development 
Cover costs of 
education, 
training, and 
medical support 
200.000 
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 School drop-outs Centres for 
Vocational 
Training for 
Disadvantage 
populations 
Ministry of 
Social 
Development 
 14.207 
/year 
 Children 
between 4 and 6 
of poor families 
Jardin d’Enfants Ministry of 
Social 
Development 
Access to pre-
school and 
primary 
education 
69.000 
 Poor and 
vulnerable 
population in 
urban areas 
Housing 
programs 
 Social housing  
 Rural 
populations 
Program to Fight 
Poverty in Rural 
Areas 
National 
Initiative for 
Human 
Development 
(INDH) 
Supports 
subprojects e.g. 
aimed at 
increasing access 
to equipment 
and social 
services such as 
health and 
education 
457.571 
/year 
 532 selected 
urban 
neighbourhoods 
Program to Fight 
Social Exclusion 
in Urban Areas 
National 
Initiative for 
Human 
Development 
(INDH) 
?  
 10 categories of 
vulnerable 
persons (widows, 
disabled, 
orphans, drug 
users, HIV 
affected, etc.) 
Program to Fight 
Social and 
Economic 
Vulnerability 
National 
Initiative for 
Human 
Development 
(INDH) 
Supports 
subprojects 
 
Source CLEISS, 2015a; ISSA, 2010; The World Bank, 2015 
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appendix 5 List of persons consulted 
Interviews between 14 and 29 September 2016 in Rabat 
Mrs. Khadija Meshek, Juriste Experte en Législation Sanitaire 
Dr. Hafid Hanchi, National Professional Officer, World Health Organisation 
Mr. Abdelaziz Adnane, Directeur de la CNOPS 
Mr. Aziz Khorsi, Chef de Division de la Communication, CNOPS 
Mr. Abdellatif Moustratraf, Chef du Département des Opérations et de Gestion du RAMED, Agence 
National de l’Assurance Maladie 
Mr. Abdil Nrigui, Chargé des Relations Publiques,  Agence National de l’Assurance Maladie  
Dr. Laïla Ibn Makhlouf, Chef de la Division des Normes Médica-techniques, Agence National de 
l’Assurance Maladie  
Dr. Abdelmajid Sahnoun, Conseiller, Agence National de l’Assurance Maladie 
Mr. Franck Iyanga, Secrétaire Général de l’Odt travailleurs immigrés au Maroc, Organisation 
Démocratique du TravailMr. Habib Karoum, Chef de Service Hôpital et président de l’Association 
Marocaine des sciences infirmières et techniques sanitaires (AMSITS) 
Mrs. Rachida Fadil, Présidente de l’Association des sage femmes au Maroc (ANSFM) 
Mr. Mourad Gourouhi, Directeur exécutif, Association Tanmia.ma 
Mr. Mohamed Benyamna, Trésorier Aribat Moubadara 
Mr. Ali Lofti, Président du Réseau Marocain pour la Défense du Droit à la Santé, et Secrétaire Général 
de Organisation Démocratique du Travail (ODT) 
Prof. Dr. Abdeljalil Cherkaoui, ex-directeur de l’Entraide Nationale du Maroc 
Mrs. Asma El Alami El Fellousse L., Economiste, Ecole Nationale de Santé Publique et Secrétaire 
générale de Réseau d'Economie et Systèmes de Santé au Maghreb. ex MinexMS Chef de Service de 
l’Economie Sanitaire 
Mrs. Amal El Amri, secrétaire national chargée du département international de Union des 
Travailleurs Marocaine 
Dr. Hassan Smilali, Ministère de la Santé, division RAMED 
Mrs. Khadija Meshek, Juriste Experte en Législation Sanitaire 
Mr. Malik Souali, CTB-BTC Maroc 
 
Interviews between 10 and 22 May 2016 in Senegal (Kaolack, Koungheul, Thiès, Dakar) 
Mr. Vincent Vercruyssen, représentant résident, BTC-CTB Senegal 
Mrs. Fabienne Ladrière, responsable projet PAODES à Kaolack, BTC-CTB Senegal 
Mr. Stefaan Van Bastelaere, senior health expert, BTC-CTB Brussel 
Mr. Paul Bossyns, coordinator of the Cel Health, BTC-CTB Brussel 
Mr. Malick Ndiaye, expert Paodes Kaolack, BTC-CTB Senegal 
Mr. Seyni Thiam, chargé de programme, BTC-CTB Senegal 
Mr. Dirk De Clercq, Ambassadesecretaris voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking 
Mr. Ibrahima Senghor, directeur general de l’Unité Départementale d’Assurance Maladie (UDAM) 
de Koungheul 
Mr. André Demba Wade, coordonnateur, Groupe Recherche Appui initiatives Mutualistes (GRAIM) 
Mr. François Paté Diopp, chef d’équipe, Abt Associates 
Mr. Mbaye Sene, Conseiller en Financement Social, Abt Associates 
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Mr. Cheikh Seydi Aboubeker Mbengue, directeur général, l’Agence de la Couverture maladie 
universelle (CMU), Ministère de la Santé et de l’Action Sociale 
Mr. Serigne Diouf, représentant du directeur général, l'Agence de la Couverture maladie universelle 
(CMU), Ministère de la Santé et de l’Action Sociale 
Mr. Ousseynou Diop, directeur du Registre National Unique (RNU), délégation générale à la 
protection sociale et à la solidarité nationale (DGPSN) 
Mr. Sérigne Diouf, chef du Service Régional de Dakar, l’Agence de la Couverture maladie universelle, 
Ministère de la Santé et de l’Action Sociale 
Mr. Babacar Lo, conseiller en renforcement du système de santé, USAID Senegal 
Mr. Karim Cisse, directeur général du Travail et de la Sécurité sociale, Ministère du Travail 
Mr. Pape Birama Diallo, vice-président du haut conseil du dialogue social et chef du Département 
Dialogue Social et Négociation Collective, Union Nationale des Syndicats Autonomes du Sénégal 
(UNSAS) 
Mrs. Marième Ba Konate, secretaire géneral, l'Union Démocratique des Travailleurs du Sénégal 
(UDTS) 
Mr. X, Confédération Nationale des Travailleurs du Sénégal (CNTS) 
Mrs. Francoise Medor, l'Union Démocratique des Travailleurs du Sénégal (UDTS) 
Mr. Baba Ngom, secretaire général en retraite, Conseil National de Concertation et de Coopération 
des Ruraux (CNCR) 
Mr. Mamadou Cisse, point focal santé, Conseil des Organisations Non Gouvernementales d’Appui 
au Développement (CONGAD) 
Mr. Mbaye Dia, président, Conseil des Organisations Non Gouvernementales d’Appui au 
Développement (CONGAD) 
Mr. Sanor Dieye, economiste chargé suivi protection sociale, Unité Coordination et Suivi de la 
Politique Economique (UCSPE), de la Direction Général de la Planification et des Politiques 
Economiques (DGPPE) du Minsitère de l’Economie, des Finances et du Plan 
Mr. Mamadou Dia, Unité Coordination et Suivi de la Politique Economique (UCSPE), de la Direction 
Général de la Planification et des Politiques Economiques (DGPPE) du Minsitère de l’Economie, 
des Finances et du Plan 
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